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THE SUPREME COURT'S INDIAN LAW DECISIONS:
DEVIATIONS FROM CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES AND THE CRAFTING OF JUDICIAL
SMALLPOX BLANKETS
Gloria Valencia-Weber
It is a pity that so many Americans today think of the Indian as a roman-
tic or comic figure in American history without contemporary signifi-
cance. In fact, the Indian plays much the same role in our American so-
ciety that the Jews played in Germany. Like the miner's canary, the
Indian marks the shifts from fresh air to poison gas in our political at-
mosphere; and our treatment of Indians, even more than our treatment
of other minorities, reflects the rise and fall in our democratic faith.'
I. THE RELATIONAL METAPHOR: SMALLPOX BLANKETS
AND SUPREME COURT CASES
A. The Artifacts of Relationships with Indian Nations
The metaphorical concept of smallpox blankets arises from two
sources: the cultural practices of publicly shaming harmful actors and
the historical experience of the indigenous peoples in the United
States (U.S.), the tribal sovereigns, who were deliberately exposed to
deadly microbes. Many cultural frameworks publicly shame actors
who persistently deviate from norms and fail to respect humans and
the environmental life of our world. In the author's upbringing,
those whose wrongful behavior inflicted injuries were called "los sin
vergfienzos" (those without shame).2 The offending parties ulti-
mately forced the community to publicly expose the destructive be-
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indebted to Professors Kenneth Bobroff and Chris Fritz, colleagues at UNM, and Professor G.
William Rice, University of Tulsa College of Law, who provided helpful insights. Invaluable re-
search assistance was provided by Danielle Her Many Horses (UNM Law School, Class of 2002),
Thomas Mucci (UNM Law School, Class of 2002), and Barbara Lah and Ronald Wheeler, UNM
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I Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE
L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
2 This article is dedicated to the elders, especially Amalia Mendivil Valencia, who nurtured
the humanity of their children and community, and to Angie Debo, scholar and ethical guide.
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havior as a corrective. The exposure was necessary for the well-being
of the community and the wrongdoers, whose reform could produce
reconciliation and a future with mutual respect and enriching rela-
tionships.
Smallpox blankets and the Supreme Court's Indian law cases are
inseparable from historical relationships between the American In-
dian sovereigns' and Euro-Americans. These specific objects and de-
cisions are a result of the historical relationship. Smallpox blankets
infected American Indians as the result of intentional acts where the
donor knew of the deadly microbes. Normal "uninfected" blankets
enabled the political, commercial, and personal relationships pur-
sued between the indigenous peoples and the outsiders.4 While in-
nocent ventures could lead to disease outbreaks, the concern here is
for the intentional in the relationships mandated when the Euro-
Americans encountered the Natives and had to deal with mutual, as
well as conflicting, interests. For the Native Americans, the blankets
were objects to bind the parties in explicit understandings as well as
friendship to transcend discrete events. This indigenous value of
blankets, which continues today, made the infested blankets espe-
cially destructive of trust and good-will. Out of these types of rela-
3 Identifiers are often interchanged in referring to the indigenous nations within the
boundaries of the United States. "American Indian" and "Native American" are used in this
paper to refer to the first sovereigns within the borders of the United States and their members.
Over 550 federally recognized tribes, in the lower forty-eight states and Alaskan Natives, com-
prise the sovereigns in nation-to-nation relations with the United States. 65 Fed. Reg. 13,198-
13,303 (March 10, 2000).
4 Personal relationships, trade, and formal relations, as in treaty-making, included the use
of blankets. "In a peace treaty between Governor Richard Nicolls of New York and the Esopus
Indians, dated October 3, 1665, the tribe ceded a tract of land to the governor in exchange for
blankets, powder, and other implements." DAVID E. WAILKINS & K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA,
UNEVEN GROUND: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNIYAND FEDERAL LAW 33 (2001).
5 Extralegal resolution of a contemporary controversy, the use of the name and image of
Crazy Horse on malt liquor, resulted in an official apology by John W. Stroh III of the Stroh's
Brewing Company to the descendents of Crazy Horse from the Cheyenne River Sioux, Oglala
Sioux, and Rosebud Sioux tribes. In a lengthy ceremony in South Dakota, Stroh III delivered
the apology. Then the Stroh's company "presented the family with 32 Pendleton blankets, 32
sweet grass braids, 32 tobacco ties and seven thoroughbred horses. Seven breweries produced
and distributed Crazy Horse Malt Liquor in 32 states." David Melmer, Crazy Horse Wins-Again:
Stroh Apologizes Amid Great Ceremony, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, May 9, 2001, at Al, col. 3. The
litigation and ceremony fit the construct of a cultural shaming when Crazy Horse, a renowned
and beloved leader of the Lakota Sioux, vigorously opposed the use of alcohol by Lakota peo-
ple. The legal history of the case is complex and involves the tribe's efforts to exercise jurisdic-
tion over non-Indians. See Estate of Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., No. Civ. 93-204, 23 In-
dian L.R. 6104 (Rosebud Sioux S. Ct. 1996) (In action for knowing and willful tortuous
interference with customary rights of privacy and respect for the decedent and his family, the
Court reversed trial court findings as to personal and subject matter jurisdiction and its dis-
missal of Lanham Act claim, but affirmed the dismissal of the Indian Arts and Crafts claim.).
Subsequently, the federal courts rendered their decisions. See Hornell Brewing Co. v. The
Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court, 133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the tribal court did
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tionships came the foundational principles, the constitutional con-
struct, of how the state or federal government would act in affairs
with the Indian nations.
The smallpox metaphor is offered with full regard for historical
facts and the appropriateness of the fit between the blankets and the
cases. Blankets infected with smallpox had hidden organisms that, at
minimum, debilitated the victim and among the especially vulner-
able, like the American Indians, almost certainly resulted in death. 6
The pronouncement in Nevada v. Hicks' that states have inherent ju-
risdiction on reservations is another unacknowledged, but inten-
tional, judicial microbe that endangers the cultural and political life
of American Indians. The existing stock of similarly generated
pathogens includes, among others, the sub-rosa abandonment of
longstanding presumptions in law that sustained tribal jurisdiction
replaced by rootless new ones. Collaterally, there are the unstated
reversals of precedent cases, established doctrines, and canons of
construction that provided some guidance to offset the instability in
Indian law. Perhaps most disturbing is the Court's construction of
plenary judicial power that lacks constitutional origins and invades
Congress' enumerated and exclusive power in relations with Indian
tribes. While Congress has imperfectly used its power, nonetheless, it
was the constitutionally designated heir to carry on the relations be-
gun by the Europeans.
In all of the Americas, the initially outnumbered Europeans were
able to reduce the military and political power of Native peoples
through the advantages of weaponry and microbes.8 Post-contact
not have jurisdiction over suit alleging defamation, violation of the estate's right of publicity,
negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Indian Arts and
Crafts Act and the Lanham Act); Witko v. Hornell Brewing Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (D.S.D.
2001) (holding that the federal district court has personal jurisdiction over brewing company
owners under the effects test, and inconvenience to the owners was outweighed by the extent of
their purposeful conduct).
6 See E. WAGNER STEARN & ALLEN E. STEARN, THE EFFECT OF SMALLPOX ON THE DESTINY OF
THE AMERINDIAN 73-74 (1945). Smallpox is a punishing disease in its immediate and long-term
effects, if the victim survives. The fevers and lesions are painful and enfeebling and the survivor
faces disfiguring scars and loss of sight and hearing.
7
533 U.S. 353, 365 (2001) (finding the tribal court's jurisdiction did not extend to tort
claims against state officials for execution of a search warrant on the reservation for an off-
reservation crime or adjudication of section 1983 claims).
8 See generallyJARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL (1997) (examining how geography
and environment shape the evolution of societies); ROY PORTER, THE GREATEST BENEFIT TO
MANKIND: A MEDICAL HISTORY OF HUMANIY 165-66 (1998) (describing how smallpox accom-
panied Hernan Cortez (1485-1547) to Montezuma's Aztec Mexico in a pattern followed by
other explorers and territories of the Americas); see also PORTER, supra, at 165:
Infections thus primed and sped conquest, rippling outwards to fell countless indigenes
the Spanish troops did not have to butcher. The consequent epidemics did not merely
exterminate vast numbers, they destroyed the will to resist-the psychological impact was
as devastating as the physical. Between 1518 and 1531, perhaps one third of the total In-
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epidemics decimated the indigenous people lacking resistance to
measles, smallpox, influenza, and other diseases introduced to the
Western hemisphere.9 "The most lethal pathogen Europeans intro-
duced to Native Americans, in terms of the total number of casual-
ties, was smallpox. It was also the earliest Old World pathogen that
we can be sure invaded the native peoples of North America." , More
recently in the United States, the American Indian population has
been decimated by their relationships with the English who took mat-
ters into their own hands and deliberately bestowed smallpox-
infected blankets and clothing.
Military officers, traders, and settlers advocated the use of small-
pox blankets when inconvenienced by tribes who insisted on possess-
ing and exercising authority over their lands. Perhaps the most un-
ashamed advocate was Baron Jeffrey Amherst, the military
commander of British Colonial forces, who instructed his officer,
"[y]ou will do well to try to inoculate the Indians by means of blan-
kets as well as to try every other method that can serve to extirpate
this exorable race." Stearn and Stearn document a pattern of
smallpox outbreaks when Europeans suspected that Indian opposi-
tion to white settlements or to traders would lead to violent resistance
and attacks on settlers. These outbreaks or epidemics happened just
in time to save the Europeans.'2 When Indians and traders met for
dian population died of smallpox, while the Spanish hardly suffered. With allies like mi-
crobes, the Europeans did not require many soldiers or much military acumen.
9 See STEARN & STEARN, supra note 6; see generally DANIEL T. REFF, DISEASE, DEPOPULATION,
AND CULTURE CHANGE IN NORTHWESTERN NEW SPAIN, 1518-1764 (1991) (exploring the cultural
and demographic consequences of Spanish-induced disease in present day northern Mexico
and the Southwest United States); see also 2 SHERBURNE F. COOK & WOODROW BORAH, ESSAYS IN
POPULATION HISTORY: MEXICO AND THE CARIBBEAN 414-35 (1974) (studying mortality patterns
in Mexico since 1860).
10 HENRY F. DOBYNS, THEIR NUMBER BECOME THINNED: NATIVE AMERICAN POPULATION
DYNAMICS IN EASTERN NORTH AMERICA 11 (1983) (providing a listing of epidemic episodes in
North America and comparative charts with the incidence of other diseases). Extensive analysis
of the North American experience is provided in the articles in Part I: Disease Before and After
Contact, in DISEASE AND DEMOGRAPHY IN THE AMERICAS 1-166 (John W. Verano & Douglas H.
Ubelaker eds., 1992).
n STEARN & STEARN, supra note 6, at 44-45. Amherst, for whom the town in Massachusetts
was named, was the British commander in the French and Indian War of 1754-63. He delivered
the first victory to the British against the French who had powerful Indian tribes as allies.
12 See id. at 44-46. See also JONATHAN B. TUCKER, SCOURGE: THE ONCE AND FUTURE THREAT
OF SMALLPOX 19-20 (2001). During the French and Indian War, Pontiac led the Ottawa, Dela-
ware, Shawnee, and Mingo tribes in their attack against the British on Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh) in
May 1763. Before Colonel Henry Bouquet could follow Amherst's orders, a tribal delegation
visited the fort to advise the besieged British that they should surrender. Two blankets and
handkerchiefs from the Smallpox Hospital were given to the delegation and an epidemic en-
sued among the tribes that had been besieging Fort Pitt. Tucker also describes the British use
of smallpox against the rebellious American colonists. Id. at 19-22.
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commercial transactions, these trade events, even when innocent of
intent to harm, were followed by outbreaks among the Indians."5
The psychological impact of the fear of smallpox terrorized the
indigenous populations and magnified the actual experiences in the
world emerging after European contact.1 4 Consider the events since
September 11, 2001, the real attacks of anthrax, and the perceived
threat of smallpox as a terrorist's tool. One can understand how in-
digenous people experienced a desperate fear. The distrust of Euro-
Americans and the fear of intentional infection led some tribes to re-
fuse the protection of inoculation against smallpox, among the earli-
est of successful immunizations. 5
Relationships with the Euro-Americans, however, could not be
evaded and would continue to change the lives of American Indians.
B. The Latest Blanket: Inherent State Jurisdiction on the Reservation
Hicks, in its declaration of "[t] he States' inherent jurisdiction on
reservations,"' 6 presented the latest of the judicial toxic blankets. To-
day, the eviscerating potential of the Court's Indian law decisions
provokes a real and palpable fear among tribal nations for their fu-
ture existence. The decisions aggrandize state jurisdiction over In-
dian governments and their territory. Like smallpox blankets, the
Court's judgments create an immediate debilitating impact, confu-
sion in Indian Country for the tribal governments and their neigh-
boring governments. The governmental neighbors who often work
together on common concerns find that governance is now unneces-
sarily complex. For tribes especially, governmental planning and
economic development have become more problematical. An ordi-
nary exigency, such as an accident somewhere in Indian Country,
with an immediate need for emergency medical services, fire services,
and possibly the need to arrest an offender, raises questions about
which government has the authority to respond. The cumulative de-
1s See Henry F. Dobyns, Native American Trade Centers as Contagious Disease Foci, in DISEASE AND
DEMOGRAPHYIN THE AMERICAS, supra note 10, at 215-36.
14 See TUCKER, supra note 12; see also DIAMOND, supra note 8.
15 See STEARN & STEARN, supra note 6, at 64-65. Europeans, including royalty and Napoleon,
who had his army vaccinated, had benefited since Edward Jenner successfully developed the
vaccine in the late 1790s. Jenner began his experiments after observing that cowpox, a cattle
disease, when contracted by humans conferred immunity against smallpox. His successful in-
oculation of a child in 1796 was followed by his scientific publication in 1798. Knowledge of
Jenner and his vaccine spread worldwide, with publication of his research results in 1801 in the
United States. See PORTER, supra note 8, at 274-77. Under President Andrew Jackson, in 1832
Congress passed an act and appropriated funds for vaccinating Native Americans. See STEARN &
STEARN, supra note 6, at 62; see also Michael K. Trimble, The 1832 Inoculation Program on the Mis-
souri River, in DISEASE AND DEMOGRAPHYIN AMERICA, supra note 10, at 257.
16 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 365 (2001).
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cisions of the Court do not engender optimism about the future of
tribal jurisdiction when the cases eviscerate, albeit incrementally, the
authority of the first sovereigns within the borders of the United
States." Like the toxic blankets, the cases contain unacknowledged
elements that in their maximum force could destroy the tribes as cul-
turally distinct nations governing their own lands.
Hicks and Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley culminate a pur-
poseful digression in the Supreme Court's jurisprudence affecting
Native Americans. That digression produces two outcomes: that state
power should be restored to an appropriate magnitude that fits cer-
tain justices' views of federalism,'9 and that no non-Indian's person or
property should be regulated by a tribal government. To achieve
outcomes embracing this view of state and tribal authority, the Court
has deviated from orderly and fair ways to analyze legal relationships.
As David Getches has demonstrated, the Indian law cases are the cru-
cible with which to reconstruct state power, while collaterally rein-
forcing two other Court objectives. One goal proscribes programs
that benefit minorities because the Court's majority perceives them as
violative of color-blind justice, and the other goal entrenches main-
stream values as the controller of what non-majority interests shall be
protected.20
17 See Sarah Krakoff, Undoing Indian Law One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism and 7ibal
Sovereignty, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1177, 1178 (2001) (providing an exhaustive review of the incre-
mentalism in the current Supreme Court's approach to Indian law and providing an in-depth
analysis of cases since 1991, twenty-eight involving Indian law questions, of which twenty-two
were decided against the tribes or tribal litigants). Equally valuable is David H. Getches, Beyond
Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of States' Rights, Colar-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values,
86 MINN. L. REv. 267 (2001). Getches analyzes the Indian law decisions of the Burger Court
(sixty-seven cases in seventeen terms) and Rehnquist Court (forty cases in fifteen terms). Id. at
280. Moreover, he reviews the three trends of the Rehnquist era that concurrently affect Indian
law cases: state interests prevail; attempts to protect specific rights of racial minorities fail; and
mainstream values are protected. This analysis of Indian law in the context of constitutional
jurisprudence, before and after Rehnquist became the Chief Justice, is helpful, thought-
provoking, and affirms the concerns many have for the extent to which the court's vision of
states' rights has distorting power in constitutional law.
18 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (finding Navajo Nation lacked authority to tax a nontribal owner of a
hotel on the reservation but on non-Indian fee land).
19 The author has benefited from the insights provided by other scholars, including, but not
limited to: Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55 U. PITt. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing how Su-
preme Court opinions favor a vision of tribal sovereignty based on membership, rather than
geography); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and In-
terpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 381 (1993) (discussing how Indian law em-
bodies the tension between colonialism and constitutionalism and how Marshall's sensitive ap-
proach of balancing the two has since been abandoned, but a return is possible); David H.
Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law,
84 CAL. L. REV. 1573 (1996) (discussing the potential among the newer members of the Su-
preme Court to recognize that the approach which curtails tribal sovereignty can be changed).
20 Getches, supra note 17, at 317.
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This paper responds to Justice Scalia's declaration in Hicks that
"[t]he States' inherent jurisdiction on reservations can of course be
stripped by Congress."2 A search for the constitutional foundation, if
any, for the "States' inherent jurisdiction" is the engine for the pa-
per. If such a concept existed and endured so that the Court's cases
have a constitutional foundation, then it should be evident in the his-
tory of the formation of the organic instruments of the Republic.
The constitutional dialogue involved at all times attempts to define
state jurisdiction in the new republic.
The most critical issue of the continuous debate in the critical
1776-1787 period is the appropriate focus for the search: the Western
lands and how the lands and peaceful relationships would be ob-
tained from the American Indian sovereigns. Through the constitu-
tional development triggered by the War for Independence, then the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (Articles), and the
Federal Constitution, the Western lands was the lodestone issue for
establishing the authority of tribes, states, and the federal govern-
ment. The conflicting claims for state and federal authority roiled,
with "political consequences" then and now.23 The western lands can
generally be described as the country lying between the Appalachian
divide and the Mississippi River.24 Thomas Perkins Abernethy, in his
definitive study of the western lands, points out that the claims of
competing states based on their crown charters unleashed distrust
and political alliances with land speculators' greed that undermined
the national union: "This virus of sectional rivalry would have been
hazardous even in a stable, vigorous government; it was almost fatal




This account of the constitutional union is from the perspectives
in Euro-American sources. In all historical periods the American In-
dian nations have claimed title and sovereignty over their lands. That
indigenous perspective continues to this day despite the intervening
interferences. Euro-American history and law, as non-Indians re-
corded the narrative, is the substance of this paper. How indigenous
21 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365.
The terms in Justice Scalia's assertion, "States' inherent jurisdiction on reservations," do
not show up in Westlaw and Lexis searches of the federal cases, statutes, code of federal regula-
tions, or law reviews, except in Hicks. Prior existence of "inherent state jurisdiction" on reserva-
tions or tribal territory, as a legal concept, was not findable in the accessible databases of law.
THOMAS PERKINS ABERNETHY, WESTERN LANDS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 362
(1937) ("The primary object of this study has been to investigate the political consequences of
conflicting claims to the Western lands ... ").
24 Id. at vii. The lands north of the Ohio River also figured in the contests for title and
authority among the states themselves and the claims of the national government, but Congress,
under the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union (Articles), took control of this area in
1784. Id.
25 Id. at 366.
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peoples viewed the events affecting their sovereignty is not within the
historical scope of this paper.
The first section discusses sovereignty and the sources for founda-
tional principles that pertain to the relationships among tribes, the
states, and the federal government. The sources are the documented
discourse and covenants of the constitutional evolution, the Articles
of Confederation and Perpetual Union (Articles), and the Constitu-
tion of 1787 as they developed state jurisdiction related to Indian
matters.
Second, the paper discusses the colonial period and reality versus
the fictions or myths of discovery and conquest. Treaty making that
recognized the tribes as nations and owners of their property was the
actual practice of the Europeans and then the Euro-Americans.
These nation-to-nation relations were essential to obtain tribal land
and peaceful relations when trade, military, and political competition
thrived among the European powers.
Third, the paper covers the conflict and unity in the pre-
Revolutionary period. Besides the conflict with the Crown, pervasive
competition existed between states over lands each claimed or cov-
eted, the western lands. Competing national interests for the lands
and for avoiding war with the Indians were entwined in this period.
Fourth, the paper considers the Articles as the first U.S. model to
exclude the states from relations with the tribes. The drafting and
ratification converged on the acrimonious issue: the western lands,
which then delayed the ratification of the Articles. Ultimately, the
Constitutional Convention was necessary to save the union. Disorder,
violence, and anarchy exploded in the states. The Constitutional
Convention delegates largely agreed that Indians and their land
should be an exclusively federal matter after states' actions in this
area had endangered the union.
Fifth is a review of how the federal government implemented the
foundational principle to exclude the states. Federal power was exer-
cised through the statutes, primarily the Trade and Non-Intercourse
Acts, treaties, enabling acts for territories and states, and the dis-
claimers required of state constitutions.
Sixth is a discussion on the addition of "states' inherent jurisdic-
tion on reservations" as the latest undisclosed and destructive judicial
microbe in the Supreme Court's Indian law decisions.26 It joins oth-
ers, such as the shift from the enumerated power of Congress to judi-
cial plenary power. Collaterally, the Court has reversed the presump-
tion favoring tribal jurisdiction to one that presumes state power is
primary. The historical review of the constitutional principles estab-
26 Hicks, 533 U.S. at 365.
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lishes that state jurisdiction over tribal lands lacks a foundation. It is,
in fact, contrary to the philosophy and framework of the U.S. to con-
struct such state authority from the collection of rootless concepts in
the Court's decisions. Stopping the damage from infectious deci-
sions outside of constitutional foundations requires some form of in-
oculation. Acting from knowledge of the role of tribal nations within
the Constitutional evolution and their status within the Constitution,
as unique sovereigns, is requisite for principled decisions.
The conclusion advocates educating the Court and citizens about
the role of the indigenous nations in the constitutional development.
Educating also involves appreciating the life that actually occurs in
Indian country. The tribal governments' retention of the authority
does not rule out collaborative relationships with the States. In fact,
there are many mutual interests, especially where the safety and wel-
fare of neighboring political entities have spillover impact. The Su-
preme Court's construct of dominant state power and jurisdictional
warfare deters making the twenty-first century of law conform to con-
stitutional ideals that accomplish fairness and justice.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THE
CONSTITUTION
The heart of the discourse unleashed by recent Supreme Court
decisions consists of sovereignty, political autonomy with actual
authority, coexistent in tribes as well as States and the federal gov-
ernment. Justice Scalia's statement in Hicks, that the States have in-
herent jurisdiction on reservations," is the latest rootless principle
pronounced by the Court. This bold declaration immediately pro-
voked the question: What inherent state jurisdiction?
What is the basis for this newly birthed claim of preexisting state
sovereignty over Indian land that is undeniably in trust and with cog-
nizable legal boundaries? Where are the history, practice, and doc-
trine that will enable those affected by the law, the American Indians
and Indian law practitioners and scholars, to recognize an express
principled justification for these recent decisions? This latest concept
of inherent state jurisdiction is another jurisprudential microbe, per-
haps spontaneously generated, fertile with potential for the Court to
plunder more authority from the tribes and bestow it on the states.
The Court's proclamation of inherent state sovereignty on Indian
lands provoked this inquiry into the foundational relationships be-
tween the tribes and the States, if any, and how it is affected by the
scope of federal power. In Sarah Krakoff's study of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Indian law, she categorizes the scholars' ap-
27 Id.
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proaches to their analyses.8 Among all scholars she notes that the
enduring norm is that tribes are separate, self-governing entities; a
norm that Indian law should affirm and strengthen.29 However, in
their approaches, Krakoff notes three camps: foundationalists, prag-
matists, and critics.
The foundationalists posit a core of doctrinal principles supporting tribal
sovereignty from which the Court has only recently strayed. The pragma-
tists are skeptical of any coherent account of the doctrine, and describe
instead an interpretive approach that would uphold tribal sovereignty in
most cases. The critics unearth the racist and colonist assumptions that
under-gird the foundations of Indian law and argue that a decolonization
of the federal-tribal relationship can occur only if the discriminatory as-
pects of those foundations are repudiated (footnotes omitted).
Individual scholars move freely across the camps. This paper takes a
foundationalist approach, but the writer has benefited from the
pragmatists and critics who have enriched the analysis in Indian law.
There are fundamental principles in the political philosophy that
shaped the United States as a revolutionary society. These core prin-
ciples emerged from the Euro-American experience of the almost
eight years (1775-1783) needed to secede from Great Britain. The
colonists had engaged the British in military confrontations starting
in 1775. After conciliation with the British did not happen, the Sec-
ond Continental Congress on May 15, 1775 passed a resolution plac-
ing the colonies in a state of defense.3' The Declaration of Inde-
pendence certainly was not the start of the hostilities.32 Concurrent
with the Revolutionary War, the colonists framed and tested impor-
tant political principles in the Articles of Confederation. The Conti-
nental Congress drafted the Articles in November 1777 and achieved
unanimous ratification by the states in March of 1781. The breaka-
way colonists conducted the war until late 1782. Great Britain offi-
cially declared the end of hostilities on February 4, 1783 and the
Congress did the same on April 11, 1783.33
In their military and civil experiences, the drafting of the Articles,
the protracted ratification process, and the federal governance of
Congress under the Articles, the colonists tested political ideas about
how power should be distributed between the local and central gov-
28 Krakoff, supra note 17, at 1192.
2 Id. at 1193.
Id. at 1192.
31 THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 111-37 (Arthur M. SchlesingerJr. ed., 1983).
In the prior decade, the colonists had objected to the Crown about taxes and other coer-
cive acts. See generally DAVID AMMERMAN, IN THE COMMON CAUSE: AMERICAN RESPONSE TO THE
COERCIVE ACES OF 1774 (1974), EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN, THE STAMP ACT
CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (1953) (detailing early American resistance and agitation).
9z THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 31, at 137.
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ernments. The post-war period was peaceful in international terms
for the United States, but not in the conduct of States with each other
or with Indians. Additionally, debt-pressed citizens turned against
their own state governments. Ultimately, the principles that would
best protect the independence and political autonomy of the un-
ion-the national state-became the foundation articulated in bind-
ing terms in the Constitution of 1787.
All of the ideas considered, adopted, abandoned, and refined in
the Articles and the Constitution developed into the constitutional
substance. About 100 years before the American Revolution, the Brit-
ish had undergone their own constitutionally defining period with
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Gordon S. Wood has described the
concept of a constitution as the basic ideas of rights and justice that
restrain the power of legislatures and monarchs. By the time of the
American breakaway, the British had moved away from their experi-
ence to an idea of a constitution in which "the English constitution
could not be any sort of fundamental law." 4 The constitution be-
came articulated as a form of parliamentary supremacy. Blackstone
and others saw no distinction between the constitution or frame of
government and the system of law.35 "All were one: every act of Par-
liament was in a sense a part of the constitution, and all law, custom-
ary and statutory, was thus constitutional."3 6 Thus, the Americans re-
tained the seventeenth-century constitutional concepts, ideas from
Whig philosophy, in the constitutional creativity of the United
States. The two forms could be made compatible." The colonists
rejected what they saw as the overreaching power of Parliament that
had imposed the Stamp Act to tax the colonies. Legislative power in
the American model had to be contained. The Americans deliber-
ately moved away from the British constitutional views of the time.
For the Euro-Americans of the new republic there was a substan-
tial difference between the unconstitutional and the illegal. The se-
34 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 260 (1969).
35 Id. at 261.
M Id.
37 For the concept of the "two constitutions," see JOHN P-iLLIP REID, IN DEFIANCE OF THE
LAW: THE STANDING-ARMY CONTROVERSY, THE TWO CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE COMING OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1981). See also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION 109-10 (1988); DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 63-
64 (1988).
38 REID, supra note 37, at 35-36:
To a degree, the two constitutional traditions were not incompatible. The assertion that
the Stamp Act was unconstitutional did not have to mean it was illegal. It was possible to
accept the new constitution of parliamentary supremacy while clinging to the old consti-
tution of fixed restraints. What Parliament enacted was lawful because that body alone
declared the law, but if it went beyond the limits of the constitution, then what it enacted
was unconstitutional. The idea was less an anomaly than a consequence of contempo-
rary jurisprudence.
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curity of life, liberty, and property were the fundamental, explana-
tory, and controlling principles.39 Samuel Adams captured the new
American view that power could be limited only "by some certain
terms of agreement."4° While the British viewed expressly written
documents with skepticism, for Adams and other colonial visionaries,
such covenants or compacts were the best security against "the dan-
ger of an indefinite dependence upon an undetermined power.
4'
The fundamentals of American constitutionalism required more than
a contract; they required a covenant or compact that would bind the
community of states. 4' According to Donald Lutz, in his study of
American constitutionalism:
The Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation to-
gether formed the Americans' first national compact. The Declaration of
Independence and the United States Constitution together form the sec-
ond national compact under which Americans live today. The first one
was based on coherent political theory, American Whiggism. The second
also had a coherent theory behind it, American federalism. The second
theory, like the second compact, did not so much replace the first as
evolve from it, a revision of the earlier experiment found to be flawed.
As we will see, that was still subject to future revision. The United States
was not founded in 1787; the nation was refounded upon a base that had
been laid earlier.43
A moral force underlay the understanding of the public commitment
in a constitution and the derived principles were constantly invoked
in the ferment of the continuous debate.
The binding principles of the U.S. Constitution continue to be
tested in the nation's societal changes. Yet, through all times, the
core principles manifest the values that bind the society. This paper
does not focus on originalism as it is often invoked in contemporary
19 WOOD, supra note 34, at 261 (quotingJoseph Howley in 1775).
40 Id. at 267.
41 Id. (quoting WRTINGS OF SAMUELADAMS III 262 (Cushing ed., 1776)). Adams noted that
to devout Whigs "vague and uncertain laws, and more especially constitutions, are the very in-
struments of slavery." Id
42 Scholars generally agree on the covenant and compact quality of U.S. constitutionalism.
See ELAZAP, supra note 37, at 90-91 (stating that covenantal or compactual obligation is broadly
reciprocal). See also id.:
Both covenants and their derivative, compacts, differ from contracts in that the first two are
constitutional or public in character and the last is private. Those bound by one or the
other are obligated to respond to one another beyond the letter of the law rather than
limit their obligations to the narrowest contractual requirements. A covenant differs
from a compact in that its morally binding dimension takes precedence over its legal di-
mension.
See also LTZ, supra note 37, at 24-34 (discussing early compacts and covenants as the origins of
the Constitution).
43 LUTZ, supra note 37, at 135.
[Vol. 5:2
SUPREME COURTS INDIAN LA WDECSIONS
political debates.A Rather, it focuses on what is historically ascertain-
able from both the discourse of constitutional creativity and the law
regimes that interpreted and applied the principles adopted. These
underlying concepts do not change and are invaluable for norms in a
society confronting new experiences.
Foundational principles must be functional and guide real people
in everyday life. Thus, for example, we struggle today with a new
experience called "the Internet," its content, and the relations it cre-
ates. Can we appropriately invoke the norm against censorship in the
First Amendment? Does intrusive spam violate the norm that re-
spects privacy? Does employer monitoring of employees' e-mail and
Internet use violate the norm against unlawful search and seizures of
the Fourth Amendment? The alternatives, if any, to the constitu-
tional principles are private and religious systems. These nonconsti-
tutional alternatives cannot guide a national society defined by its di-
versity, and would destroy the foundational core, the constitutional
covenant, meant to bind this society through all times.
The complexity of Indian law lies in the preconstitutional and ex-
traconstitutional sovereignty of tribes.46 This unique quality of Indian
law does not nullify the development of constitutional principles in
the cases, in the tools of jurisprudence like the canons of construc-
tion, and the policies enacted by Congress. David H. Getches coun-
sels: "To be sure, these Rehnquist-era decisions departing from, but
not overruling, venerable principles have created a veneer of confu-
44 See generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLrrICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSrrTUnlON xiii (1996):
The advocates of originalism argue that the meaning of the Constitution (or of its indi-
vidual clauses) was fixed at the moment of its adoption, and that the task of interpreta-
tion is accordingly to ascertain the meaning and apply it to the issue at hand. The critics
of originalism hold that is no easy task to discover the original meaning of a clause, and
that even if it were, a rigid adherence to the ideas of framers and ratifiers would convert
the Constitution into a brittle shell incapable of adaptation to all the changes that distin-
guish the present from the past.
45 Id. at xv:
[Blecause I firmly believe that the framers and many of the ratifiers were themselves de-
cidedly empirical in their approach to politics, it seems rather beside the point to ask
how they would act today. Whatever else we might say about their intentions and under-
standings, this at least seems clear: They would not have denied themselves the benefit of
testing their original ideas and hopes against the intervening experiences that we have
accrued since 1789.
46 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 112-13 (1987):
Our jurisprudence, then, has recognized tribal authority as being both preconstitutional
and extraconstitutional. These principles are premises for the conclusions that Ameri-
can Indian governments can be, for example, theocratic, hereditary, and race-based in
citizenship. Powerful moral and historical considerations support this special tribal
status. European nations recognized similar notions half a millennium ago, and in the
United States all three federal branches have acknowledge the special attributes of In-
dian tribal sovereignty from the beginning.
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sion over a historically complex, but consistent body of law."47 In con-
trast, David E. Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima describe the field
as historically the "uneven ground" of federal Indian policyY5 They
remind us that over time this jurisprudence has been marked by 4n-
constancy, indeterminacy, and variability in judicial interpretation. 9
However, Getches reminds us of the risks of categorical denuncia-
tion of the field:
Painting a picture of abject confusion rather than seeking to understand
all of Indian law in its historical context has its risks. It may imply that it
is up to the Court to wade in and "do justice." Nice though this may
47 Getches, supra note 17, at 275 (documenting fully the perceptions of confusion among
scholars who analyze Indian law).
WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 6 (describing the history of problems of Indian
sovereignty in conflict with the United States).
49 Id. at 143-75. Numerous scholars have questioned this shift from prior understandings
and this writer acknowledges the debt to their insightful inquiry. See Getches, supra note 17, at
275 (capturing the confusion and incoherence discussed by scholars); see also Philip P. Frickey,
A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over
Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1999) ("Given the lack of guidance in positive law, the com-
plexity of the issues, and the tangled normative questions surrounding the colonial displace-
ment of indigenous peoples to construct a constitutional democracy, it is also not surprising
that the resulting decisional law is as incoherent as it is complicated."); Yuanchung Lee, Redis-
covering the Constitutional Lineage of Federal Indian Law, 27 N.M. L. REV. 273, 275 (1997) ("Con-
temporary confusion in Indian law results from a failure to recognize Indian law's close familial
ties to constitutional doctrines that lie at the core of the Supreme Court's concerns during the
last century."); Steven Paul McSloy, Back to the Future: Native American Sovereignty in the 21st Cen-
tury, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 217, 218 (1993) ("[N]o area of American law is more
distinct, anomalous, or confused than that relating to Native Americans."); Frank Pommer-
sheim, Coyote Paradox: Some Indian Law Reflections from the Edge of the Prairie, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 439,
439 (1999) ("[R]ecent developments in Indian law, particularly at the United States Supreme
Court, threaten [a] well understood and precarious balance with a new, almost vicious, histori-
cal amnesia and doctrinal incoherence."); Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Court Jurisprudence: A
Snapshot from the Field, 21 VT. L. REV. 7, 38-39 (1996) ("One need only read a sampling of recent
United States Supreme Court Indian [I]aw opinions... to realize that the nation's high court
has slipped into doctrinal incoherence."); Laurie Reynolds, "Jurisdiction" in Federal Indian Law:
Confusion, Contradiction, and Supreme Court Precedent, 27 N.M. L. REV. 359, 360 (1997) ("[Fjor
lower courts trying to decipher the implications of these pronouncements on tribal jurisdiction,
the Court's conflicting signals have created confusion and uncertainty."); Alex Tallchief Skib-
i ne, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in
Indian Country, 36 TULSA L.J. 267, 267 (2000) ("[T]he Supreme Court's current jurisprudence
in the field of federal Indian law has mystified both academics and practitioners."); Brad Jolly,
Comment, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: The Unwavering Policy of Termination Continues, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 273, 278 (1997) ("Over the past century, the legal fiction of federal Indian law has
matured into a grotesque creature capable of inflicting instant disorientation, bewilderment,
and nausea."); Ray Torgerson, Note, Sword Wielding and Shield Bearing: An Idealistic Assessment of
the Federal Trust Doctrine in American Indian Law, 2 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 165, 178 (1996) ("Most
academics and courts agree that the area of Indian law is fraught with vacillation and incoher-
ence."). See generally Curtis G. Berkey, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Bring New Confusion to the
Law of Indian Sovereignty, in RETHINKING INDIAN LAW 77 (National Lawyers Guild Committee on
Native American Indian Struggles ed., 1982) ("The Supreme Court's rulings on Indian sover-
eignty in the past four years demonstrate that perhaps the Court has abandoned any pretext of
principled decision-making. Rather, the Court has embarked on a result-oriented approach.").
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sound, licensing courts to reinvent Indian law based on the judges' no-
tions of justice and what is right for society could add legitimacy to an
ethnocentric judicial foray into Indian policy. Indian law has always been
based on the assumption that separate societies could exist exempt from
the American melting pot, preserving customs, values, and governance of
the vestiges of traditional tribal territory. Judges who are not steeped in
the culture and values of Indian tribalism are ill-equipped to rework
these complex and anomalous traditions case by case.
The full constitutional experience included American Indians as full
sovereigns governing over their lands. Constitutional principles,
shaped by historical events, nonetheless provide an articulated core
of law with which to evaluate the Supreme Court's Indian law cases.
The Supreme Court's vision of federalism extends state jurisdic-
tion over Indian people and their lands as if such state authority were
foundational in the law of the new republic. Yet the true foundation
was generated from the political records and the organic instruments
that established the republic as it struggled with the discord sur-
rounding the western lands. The sources constitute authenticated
guidance and reflect the debate and resolution that the States had to
yield any claims to authority in relationships with Indians to a central,
national government. This directive principle is explicit in the his-
tory and documents of the encounters between the European Ameri-
cans and the tribal nations. These national entities pursued political
relationships that produced treaties, the instrument for the constitu-
tional objective.
The historical review, infra, evidences that in relationships with
and authority in matters involving the American Indian nations, the
exclusion of States was firmly established as a foundational principle.
The Articles of Confederation and the Constitution were the prod-
ucts of a continuous internal debate and interim attempts to resolve
the western lands and Indians problem. The question of who could
have relationships with the tribal nations persistently undermined the
creation of an enduring national union. Certainly time and circum-
stances have changed the tribes, the States, and the federal govern-
ments in ways unforeseeable to the constitutional framers. The com-
plexity of how any government functions successfully in the twenty-
50 Getches, supra note 17, at 276 (pointing out the temptation to craft an easy and radical
solution for incoherence in the field in Justice Souter's concurrence in Atkinson Trading Co. v.
Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 659-60 (2002)). justice Souter embraced Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981), as the source for doctrinal coherence, further raising a "once marginal" case to
primary status. In Montana the Court circuitously created exceptions to the long-standing as-
sumption of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and
non-Indian fee land in the Indian Country statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1151, passed in 1948. See Mon-
tana v. United States, 450 U.S. at 562.
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first century makes invaluable the foundational principles for making
justice real in the functional life of the three sovereigns.
III. COLONIAL FICTIONS AND THE REALITY OF CONFLICT
A. Counterfactual Stories
Understanding the history of relations between the indigenous
peoples and the European colonists requires putting aside the fic-
tions of discovery and conquest that informed the social history and
law affecting American Indians. If these fictions only assumed mythic
status in popular history, perhaps their impact would be corrected
through historical scholarship."5  However, the stories of discovery
and conquest informed the construction of Indian law in the critical
period when the cases involving Indians reached the first Supreme
Court." Consequently, counterfactual legal constructs continue to
coexist with Justice Marshall's ultimate recognition that the tribes
were sovereigns that predated the arrival of Europeans. The holding
51 See AMERICA IN 1492: THE WORLD OF THE INDIAN PEOPLES BEFORE THE ARRIVAL OF
COLUMBUS 6 (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr. ed., 1992) ("History still teaches falsely that pre-Columbian
America was a wilderness, a virgin land, virtually untenanted, unknown, and unused, waiting for
the white explorers and pioneers, with their superior brains, brawn, and courage to conquer
and 'develop' it."). Josephy then quotes from RICHARD N. CURRENT, T. HARRY WILLIAMS &
ALAN BRINKLEY, AMERICAN HISTORY: A SURVEY (1987), stating that while civilizations were being
developed in Africa, Asia, and Europe, "the continents we know as the Americas stood empty of
mankind and its works .... [t] he story of the new world.., is a story of the creation of a civili-
zation where none existed." Josephy counters that besides overlooking the almost 75 million
Indians demographers now estimate were living in the Americas (about six million within the
present-day U.S.), the historians said:
nothing of the challenges met and overcome by the Indians as the original pio-
neers... of the many marvelous innovations, inventions, and adaptations of their socie-
ties and civilizations.., developed without benefit of Western European advice and assis-
tance ... and of such Indian attainments and institutions as intricate calendrical systems,
land and sea trade networks extending for hundreds and even thousands of miles, cities
larger at the time than any in Europe, and political and social systems ....
AMERICA IN 1492, supra at 6.
52 See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823) (holding that discovery and con-
quest by force terminated American Indians' absolute title, and they retained only title of occu-
pancy); see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) (stating that the superior
policy, arts, and arms of the Euro-Americans resulted in "peculiar" relations between the United
States and the tribes, who are not a foreign state able to invoke the Court's jurisdiction). As
M'Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) demonstrate, American Indians as
governments or individuals are often not the parties in significant cases. It is still a pattern of
our time that controversies in which non-Indians are the disputing parties result in decisions
that affect, often detrimentally, the rights of American Indians. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum v.
New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (upholding the state's severance tax on a non-Indian corpo-
ration engaged in an enterprise with the tribe on its trust land). There, the double burden of
taxation (state and tribal) created a disincentive for non-Indians to enter into economic devel-
opment ventures with tribes and interferes with the federal policy that tribes should exercise
economic self-determination, but the Court disagreed. See id. at 186.
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in Worcester v. Georgia that the tribes were nations in a unique political
relationship only with the federal national government fits the rela-
tionships that actually occurred through the formalities of treaty mak-
ing.
53
The colonists chose treaty making to obtain what they needed
from the Native Americans who had superiority over the Euro-
Americans in population, military strength, possession of land, criti-
cal resources, and knowledge for surviving in the environment alien
to newcomers. 54 From the moment of arrival the Europeans had in-
55terests that preoccupied them. Then the new Americans had to
continuously strategize on how the political, economic, and military
interests of the tribes could be allied or, at minimum, neutralized so
that the revolution and the emerging republic could succeed. As
the Americans entered their war,
[a]lready agreements had been negotiated that needed to be honored.
The first treaty between the United States and an Indian nation, the De-
lawares, was signed in 1778. So concerned was the young Congress about
the delicate diplomatic balance during the Revolution that the Delawares
were offered the possible opportunity of statehood, but this offer was
never renewed after the Revolution was over.
57
53 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542, 559-60:
America... was inhabited by distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent
of each other and of the rest of world, having institutions of their own, and governing
themselves by their own laws. The very words "treaty" and "nation" are words of our own
language, selected in our diplomatic and legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having
each a definite and well understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we
have applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to all in the same
sense.
Recalcitrant states still acted unilaterally, despite the Constitution and the statutory direc-
tives from Congress. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (hold-
ing the 1795 Treaty that the State of New York made with Oneidas was invalid and tribe had
viable claim for damages).
54 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4 at 33. Between the British and Indian tribes, 175
treaties were made from 1607 (with the Powhatan Confederacy of Virginia) to 1775 (with the
Iroquois of Ohio, the Shawnees and the Delawares).
See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 47-58 (1982) (covering the pre-
Revolutionary War period of relations).
See ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 175 ("At the beginning of the War, Congress had
adopted a policy of encouraging the Western Indians to maintain a status of neutrality.").
George Washington, commander of the federal forces, had urged this policy. Abernethy then
describes the inconsistent or frustrated efforts to achieve the neutrality of Indians. This goal
became entangled in private ambitions of persons who acted for the union and for their own
interests in trade and land. See id. at 175-79; see also ROBERTA. WILLIAMS, JR., LINKING ARMS
TOGEHER AMERICANINDIAN TREATYVISIONS OFIAW& PEACE 1600-1800, at 114-15 (1997) (de-
scribing the League of the Iroquois (also called the League of the Haudenosaunee by the Iro-
quois themselves), who properly were respected by the colonial powers from all foreign states
because the Leagues alone could muster up to 2000 warriors, and if allied tribes joined them
the League's military strength became even more formidable for outnumbered colonists).
57 JOHN R. WUNDER, "RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:" A HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE
BILL OF RIG-ns 19 (1994).
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The nation-builders, once they won their freedom from the Crown,
knew that they had to obtain land from the tribal nations in a way
that provided peaceful coexistence. All of these interests were pur-
sued by the productive methods of treaties and negotiated contracts
for obtaining land, economic exchanges, and stable political relation-
ships.
Treaties, agreements requiring mutually respectful relations and
consent of the governed, were the primary means for the indigenous
nations to fit in the model of the new republic. Congress established
a Northern Department and Southern Department to pursue trea-
ties.as The Indian nations were not part of the dialogue when the
States struggled through the "mutuality of concessions" that formed
the Union. Yet, as a political state within the boundaries of the
United States, the Indian nations have ways in which they connect
and do not connect to the principles articulated by the framers.
In the Americans' invention of their government, two critical
principles were constraints on majoritarian power and protecting the
equality of individuals. These principles do not comprehend the
unique status of the tribes as political states. Restraining the abuse of
majoritarian power resounds in the protection of disfavored minori-
ties that Carolene Products articulated as a judicial duty. °  However,
anti-majoritarianism does not adequately address the rights that Indi-
ans claim as a political entity, rather than as a discrete and insular
minority class. Morton v. Mancari affirmed the distinct political status
and the unique tribal-federal relationship in the constitutional con-
struct.6 ' American Indians are notjust an aggregate of distinctly iden-tified individuals nor a private club.62 Likewise, equality and fair
See ABERNETY, supra note 23, at 316 (listing some of the treaties in the Confederate pe-
riod: Six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy at Fort Stanwix, October 22, 1784 (second treaty);
Treaty of Fort Mintosh with the Wyandottes, Delawares, Chippewas and Ottawas, January 21,
1785; Treaty with the Shawnees at Fort Finney, January 31, 1785).
59 See Blatchford v. Native American Viii. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991) (discussing
how states mutually consented to be sued by each other, but not by the Indian tribes); see also
Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Court, 56 U. CH. L. REV.
671, 701-02 (1989).
60 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (deferring for an-
other time the question of "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes or-
dinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry"). American Indi ans, like other discretely identified populations,
have been subjected to the prejudice and resulting discrimination of concern here in Carolene
Products. That, however, is not the principle for the protection that Indians seek for tribal col-
lective rights as a political entity.
61 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (explaining that Indian preference in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring and promotion is reasonable and related to a rational goal be-
cause it is political rather than merely racial in nature).
62 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (stating that "Indian tribes within 'In-
dian country' are a good deal more than 'private, voluntary organizations'").
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treatment, the equal protection and due process principles, focused
on individual rights. The only collective rights in the Constitution, in
the Indian Commerce Clause, attest to the unique status of the tribal
nations. Thus, the unique situation that holds today: only American
Indian individuals are citizens of three discrete sovereigns within the
borders of the United States.
The tribe's collective quality is more than a legal characteristic; it
culturally shaped the tribes' view of the treaties they made with the
Euro-Americans. Robert A. Williams reminds us how the indigenous
nations viewed the treaties as more than contracts, but as enduring
commitments to "brotherly" care. 6" Certainly the early treaties were
understandings that only nations as peers can make; subsequent trea-
ties still involved state-based relationships though the parties had dis-
parate power. In the indigenous view, these covenants or compacts
were an obligation of each party to protect the interests of the other,
for mutual safety and security. Land transactions were to bind, not
separate, the parties, and thus form multi-cultural unity.64 The in-
digenous nations sought to generate something akin to the natural
covenants that bound each tribal community.
Both contracts and covenants can build and maintain communi-
ties, but in the colonial context the indigenous peoples and the Euro-
Americans had differing objectives.
Both contracts and covenants bring people together, by choice, into
some kind of association or society. Contracts, however, assume a het-
erogeneity of interests among the associates .... The act of contracting
makes certain kinds of relationships possible that would be impossible
without the contractual guarantees and protections. The act of covenant-
ing affirms and deepens intrinsic natural as well as accomplished histori-
cal relationships of common purpose and commitment. A covenanted
community is one cemented by trust through its shared sense of mean-
ing. If human life is authenticated and fulfilled in a community, then a
covenant, or contract of homogeneous interests, strengthens the bonds
of a community so that it can accomplish these shared purposes.6
While the Euro-Americans were realists in making treaties, the cove-
nant that they pursued was among the States that lacked trust, suffi-
cient common bonds, and shared identity as they pursued independ-
ence. To construct a nation, the visionaries had to overcome the
internal nationalism of each State that defended a distinct sover-
63 WILLIAMS, supra note 56, at 98-123 ("Treaties told as stories sought to sustain a constitu-
tional tradition of human solidarity between different peoples.").
64 Id. at 115-23 (explaining how the Iroquois Covenant Chain "told a special kind of story, a
way of imagining a world of human solidarity achieved through treaty making with different
peoples").
ROBERT W. HOFFERT, A POLITICS OF TENSIONS: THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS 13 (1992).
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eignty. 66 To an outsider, especially one removed from the colonial
period, the localized sense of nationalism was parochial.
The Indian nations enjoyed the benefit of covenanted communi-
ties in their discrete tribes and their confederacies; each context af-
firmed in stories the unique identity and purposes of each tribe.67
Williams recounts the indigenous efforts to educate the States when
the Europeans and then the Euro-Americans failed to perform their
covenant obligations as a continuing constitutional obligation of
treaty partners.
68
B. Tribes and the American Revolution
Conflicting States' views of political relationships contributed to
the pervasive problem of the colonists to secure support from tribes
in the struggle for independence and afterwards to keep at bay com-
petitor nations still within the Americas. In the revolutionary and
confederacy period, the British, French, and Spanish each pursued
advantages in political, economic, and military alliances. Each ex-
ploited a strategically stated willingness to respect the tribes as politi-
cal powers who had full title to their lands,70 in contrast to expansive
states' claims to title in Indian lands. For instance, during the French
and Indian War of 1754-63, the Cherokees remonstrated the British
who failed in the covenant duty of mutual assistance. The Cherokees
used this lack of performance to withhold going to war against the
66 WOOD, supra note 34, at 356-57 (discussing the sovereignty of each state; for example, as
late as 1787 Marylanders called their state "the nation," and spokesmen for the small states, like
Roger Sherman of Connecticut, argued that "every Colony is a distinct Person ... they should
have an equal vote").
67 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 13-14 (distinguishing covenanted communities from "mere
orderliness and process"). American Indian confederacies such as the League of the Iroquois
(Haudenosaunee) and the All Indian Pueblo Council in New Mexico functioned before Euro-
pean contact and are probably the oldest governmental confederations still operating in the
United States. See Rebecca L. Robbins, Self Determination and Subordination: The Past, Present, and
Future of American Indian Governance, in NATIVE AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY 287-289 (John R. Wun-
der, ed., 1999). Robbins describes the precontact confederacies, citing especially to Sharon
O'Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments (1989) for both the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois)
Confederacy and the All Indian Pueblo Council.
68 WILLIAMS, supra note 56, at 103-05 (discussing the obligations of those involved in treaty
agreements).
69 See MERRILL JENSEN, THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE
SOCIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1774-1781, at 218-21 (1963)
(describing the intricacies of American relations with the French and Spanish during the Revo-
lutionary War); see also THOMAS A. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 19-
65 (10th ed. 1980) (capturing the shifting alliances as the British, Spanish, and French tried to
use the United States to secure their own power and territories within the United States and
externally).
70 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 26-40 (discussing the Spanish, French, British,
and United States practices that recognized Indian title).
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French. 7  This is only one instance where different conceptions of
obligation contributed to an undesirable result for those seeking
peaceful relationships.
Protecting tribes from the local ambition of colonies marked the
national policies attempted before the Revolution as well as after.7
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was the Crown's attempt to impose a
national government's preemptive power, the first such policy, over• 73
the machinations of the colonies. The Proclamation intended to as-
sure the tribes, who had favored the French in the French and Indian
War, that Britain would prevent the illegal encroachment on Indian
lands. The Proclamation aimed to protect Indians against abuses
from unregulated traders.7 4 Prohibiting settlers in the region west of
the Appalachians was necessary for peace for the Crown. However,
the colonists had long resented and disobeyed the royal rules that re-
stricted land and trade transactions with the Indians.
Moreover, the "land rich" colonies claimed their royal charters in-
cluded the frontier areas that the Crown, and subsequently, the States
and Congress, would struggle to control. The States' claims con-
tained the contradiction of claiming title from the Crown whose
authority was renounced when the colonists "Absolved from all Alle-
giance to the British Crown" in the Declaration of Independence.75
The success of the breakaway colonists became ensnared in interstate
conflicts over the western lands. Concurrently, the States denied the
71 WILLIAMS, supra note 56, at 103-04 (discussing what happens when treaty obligations are
not met).
See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055 (1995).
Clinton's article provides an excellent account of the pre- and post-revolutionary period.
Clinton's account of the pre-revolutionary dealings between American Indians and the colo-
nists, the circumstances and events that resulted in the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and of the
societal and formal debates during the drafting of Articles of Confederation is extensive.
Clinton also captures in full detail the tensions of the states' rights versus central government
approaches to relationships with Indians.
73 DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 58-60 (4th ed.
1998) (noting the reaction of the colonial governments to the Royal Proclamation of 1763);
WILICINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 176-78 (furthering the discussion on tribal-state rela-
tions during colonial times).
74 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 177 (discussing the purpose of the Royal Procla-
mation of 1763).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776), see DANIELJ. ELAZAR, THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 89-106 (1988). Among the "long train of abuses and
usurpations" the colonists charged against the Crown: "He has refused to other Laws for the
accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of
Representation in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only."
Id. at 102. Elezar offers this interpretation, "Royal action cut off the westward movement of the
American people." Id.
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national government, Congress, any entitlement or authority over the
frontier lands.76
The colonists' claims to title of the Western lands incited endur-
ing rancor and competition in the relations of the breakaway States,77
prodded by the unceasing opportunism of private speculators. Vir-
ginia claimed its crown charter of 1609 entitled it to land extending
to the Pacific Ocean as the border.78 This meant that land tides in
this area obtained by speculators and purchasers from Maryland and
other states were not valid. Land speculators included all classes of
persons and many of the constitutional framers.79  For example,
George Washington, a semi-deity in constitutional lore, like many
others, disregarded the prohibitions in the Crown's proclamation. It
was a "temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians ....
Any person, therefore, who neglects the present opportunity of hunt-
ing out good lands, and in some measure marking and distinguishing
them for his own (in order to keep others from settling them), will
never regain it.''8
Underlying the greed of speculators and the States was the expec-
tation that Indians would be removed from their lands. Abernathy
concludes that
this study of land speculation would seem to point to the conclusion that
a country cannot well afford to place its destinies in the hands of men
who are engaged in the amassing of personal fortunes. When large prof-
its are at stake neither their own consciences nor their country's distress
often give pause, even to those who are loudest in the affirmation of their
own righteousness. We have seen that this was not exclusively an Ameri-
76 Virginia was unrelenting in efforts to retain all title and control, based on its royal charter.
SeeABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 217-29, 242-73 (including three chapters on Virginia's Western
land policy in the 1778-1783 period). See also the Marshall Court's interpretation in Johnson v.
M'Intosh, where the Court stated that "[t]he power now possessed by the government of the
United States to grant lands, resided, while we were colonies, in the crown or its grantees." 21
U.S. 543, 587 (1823).
77 In the Continental Congress of 1776, as it struggled to fight the war, the Western land
claims had impact. See ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 171 ("On September 16 Congress pro-
posed to give a bounty of land to Continental troops who enlisted for the duration of the
War."). When it was proposed to pay for these lands from the general national treasury, Mary-
land led the fight to object. To objecting States, Congress would be paying for lands that were a
national resource. See id. at 171.
78 GETCHES, supra note 73, at 61-62.
79 See ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 40-58 (describing Vandalia, a land speculating venture
begun before the war in which Benjamin Franklin and his son, along with other prominent
leaders, were involved; the victory and formation of the new government were entangled in the
schemes for self-profit of these individuals).
so GETCHES, supra note 73, at 59 (instructing, in a 1767 letter, a business associate to survey
and secure two thousand acres of "good rich land" in the prohibited area) (citing II THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 218-24 (Worthington C. Ford ed., 1972), quoted in THIS




can failing; men of high place in England and in France were equally
concerned with the rebel colonists in this peculiar form of pillage of war.
The Revolution was no exception to the fact that in time of war great for-
tunes are built from the distress of the country, the excitement fostering
laxness and making it difficult for the public to be aware of what goes on
behind closed doors.
The conflicting motives of states and individuals perpetuated difficul-
ties in establishing the union dependent on peaceful relations with
the Indians. 82
During the wars to establish the new republic, most tribes sup-
ported the British, if not overtly, then by neutrality useful to protect
tribal claims of the Western lands." Powerful tribes who sided with
the Crown during the Revolutionary War held large claims to territo-
ries between the Appalachians and the Mississippi River and con-
tested any claims that the newly-born U.S. made to these ancestral
lands." Subsequently, in the War of 1812 with the Crown, most of the
tribes again supported the British. The United States tried different
means to secure Indian allies. In the Treaty of Greenville of July 22,
1814, the United States made peace with the Delaware, Miami, Se-
neca, Shawnee and Wyandot, and required the tribes to declare war
on the British."6 The tribes who supported the British felt abandoned
in the protection of their rights in the treaty ending the Revolution-
ary War and urged that this not happen with the treaty ending the
War of 1812.
In the treaty negotiations to settle the War in 1814, the British in-
sisted that the Indian Nations should be participants 
in the treaty.87
The British demanded that their Indian allies be extended peace and
that the boundary of their territory be definitively marked as a per-
81 ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 368.
GETCHES, supra note 73, at 60-63 (pointing out that Thomas Paine, the influential author
of Common Sense, the Revolutionary War pamphlet, did not disclose that he had been given
shares in a land speculating company in his spirited defense of the interest of the nation in de-
feating Virginia's unreasonable claims to control the entire western frontier).
8 See COHEN, supra note 55, at 58 (discussing how "the Crown supported the sanctity of
treaty obligations"); FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS
26-28 (1962) ("The British had the better position and had in large measure retained the alle-
giance of the Indians."); WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 37 ("[V] irtually all Indian na-
tions allied with Great Britain against the upstart colonies. .. ).
84 See ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 34-35 (describing the Cherokees balking at land cessions
in Treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1768).
85 See ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 89-95 (1970) (describ-
ing the efforts of the U.S. and Great Britain to recruit tribes as military allies and how Tecum-
seh used his superb leadership skills to unify tribes under his leadership).
86 See THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 31, at 199; WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA,
supra note 4, at 45-46 (noting that the treaty acknowledged the tribes' land title).
87 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 48-50 (showing the efforts of the British to in-
clude Indian Nations in treaty considerations).
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manent barrier between the dominions of Britain and the United
States. The British maintained that the Crown would sign a treaty
only if "the Indian nations are included in it, and restored to all the
rights, privileges, and territories which they enjoyed in the year
1811." ' After conclusion of the war in 1814, the U.S. forced land ces-
sions from tribes. Even the Lower Creeks who had remained neutral
or sided with Andrew Jackson in battles had to cede twenty-two mil-
lion acres in lower parts of western Georgia and much of Alabama.89
In the negotiations of 1814 the British delegation challenged the
United States' "novel and alarming pretension" that the Indian na-
tions were subjects of the United States and that the Indian territories
were subject to the disposal of the federal government.9° To foreclose
adding tribes as direct parties to the agreement, the United States
promised to recognizes the rights and possession of tribes that existed
prior to 1811, a provision that Britain accepted. 9' This treaty, in
which the indigenous nations were affected by the dispute between
non-Indians, perhaps made the tribes a third party beneficiary. The
War of 1812 and its resolution captured the persisting tensions, from
many sources, as the United States struggled to obtain both land and
peaceful relations from the Indian tribes.
IV. THE NEW REPUBLIC'S MODEL: EXCLUDE THE STATES FROM
RELATIONS WITH TRIBES
A. Conflict and Unity in the Colonies
Other than the shared goal of securing freedom from the Crown,
the states lacked agreement on numerous subjects, most critically the
88 Id. at 49 (describing the tribes' increasing willingness to go to war to stop Anglo advance-
ment and restore traditional Indian life). The Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa and his brother
Tecumseh led in unifying the tribes to fight on the side of Great Britain in the War of 1812.
Tecumseh fought in at least 150 engagements against the U.S. until his death, in battle, in Oc-
tober 1813 led to the collapse of his Indian confederacy and its support for the British.
89 Id. at 48 ("The United States considered this enormous land cession to be 'an equivalent
for all expenses incurred in prosecuting the war to its termination.'"); see also DEBO, supra note
85, at 96 (describing AndrewJackson's leadership during the War of 1812 and subsequent work
taking land from tribes, even those who allied with him during the war).
90 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 49.
91 Id. at 49-50 (quoting Treaty of Ghent, Article 9, 8 Stat. 747-48):
The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of
the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they
may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or
nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights, and privileges which they may have en-
joyed, or been entitled to... provided always, that such tribes or nations shall agree to
desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects,
upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to the such tribes or nations,
and shall so desist accordingly.
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western lands. Peter S. Onuf describes the intensity of the state dis-
putes. "During the war years, state leaders claimed that they would
not jeopardize the common cause by taking up arms against other
Americans, whatever the provocation. But the States' "usual animosi-
ties and jealousies will return with elastic force' in the postwar period,
according to a British prediction."" The mythic accounts of U.S. his-
tory hide the degree to which the States' aggressively pursued narrow
interests that interfered with building mutuality and trust among
themselves. The interstate disputes on the western lands formed a
ubiquitous maelstrom at each stage of the project to construct a gov-
ernment that accommodated the powers of States and a national
government. Constitutional creativity had to respond to the force of
this whirlpool.
Studies on the constitutional formation reveal a panoply of events
that informed how the conflicts affected the structure and powers as-
signed in the ultimate structure. A dual commitment to both forms
of government, state and federal, led the colonists. Robert W. Hof-
fert reminds us that past studies projecting a history of struggles and
conflicts of the American politics as well as those focusing on solidar-
ity and harmony among the states presented incomplete accounts.9
Choosing between stories of consensus and conflict ignores at least
two important elements.
First, one cannot ignore that the consensus reached by the fram-
ers resulted from the confrontation of the conflicts over the respec-
PErERS. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 5 (1983). See id. at 8-9:
[I]n 1776 many observers could not foresee the possibility of the peaceful adjustment of
conflicts .... The potential for intercolonial conflict was certainly great. The aggressive
western policy of Virginia's governor, Lord Dunmore, had precipitated a struggle for ju-
risdiction and scattered violence in the Fort Pitt region .... Meanwhile, in the Wyoming
Valley, settlers and speculators from Connecticut sought to defend their titles under the
Susquehannah Company against Pennsylvania and its claimants. Both sides threatened
to use force. Separatists in western Virginia and northeastern New York threatened to
dismember two of the most important colonies even as they prepared to withdraw from
the British Empire.
See generally id. at 3-20 (describing the conflicts between the states over territory in colonial
America).
93 HOFERT, supra note 65, at 19-20 (discussing the approaches of the scholars who have
authored the primary accounts of the formative period). See also Eric M. Freedman, Why Consti-
tutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the
Confederation Period, 60 TENN. L. REV. 783 (1993) (critiquing Jensen's thesis as one focusing on
the critical confederation period with conflict and chaos, ended by the Constitution). Freed-
man's interpretation focuses on the debates and the differences among states as a process to
build unity, moving from separate state interests to compromise and agreement on shared ide-
ology. Freedman also treats the western lands as the complex problem that "plagued Congress
repeatedly" and as the demonstration of the conflict resolution. Id. at 822-26. He statistically
analyzed the voting patterns in the roll call voting in the Continental Congress on the Articles.
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tive reach of state and federal power9 They rejected the idea of a
single nation-state, but that still left how States that declared them-
selves as independent would be covenanted to coexist with a new cen-
tral government. The 1887 Constitution reflects how the conflicts at
that time were defined, but they were not resolved forever. Moreo-
ver, certain conflicts keep recurring as an alternative form of consti-
tutional vision, e.g., the dominance of state power in the Articles.
According to Hoffert, certain "defeated" impulses "retain their valid-
ity and, most importantly, saliency" despite the documented rejec-
tion. Thus, the current Supreme Court's pursuit of restoring state
power has revived the tension in the evolved constitutional models.
However, the historical record shows that the dominant form of state
power in the Articles was rejected.
Ronald Dworkin has urged that constitutional interpretation is
not a matter of conventionalism or pragmatism.9 The Declaration of
Independence provides a direct philosophical statement, which the
Constitution lacks. The Constitution is a practical document struc-
turing how power over specific subject matter will be allocated. Thus,
interpretation combines the backward-looking approach of conven-
tionalism with the forward-looking bias of pragmatism. Hoffert, in
response to the interpretative task, states that the initial difficulty is
not a matter of textual interpretation or hermeneutics. "It is, instead
a matter of sources. In what sources do we find the elements that
constitute the fundamental principles of American politics?" 7 The
Constitutional document alone is insufficient for the inquiry on the
conflicts and how the concepts of localism and nationalism were
worked out. The pre-Constitution documents and the interim Arti-
cles contain the values of a democratic vision. These core documents
involve intensive advocacy, a form of ruminative thinking in which
words of literate political architects recur so that one can identify the
underlying principles with some degree of confidence.
After the Revolutionary War the United States faced debt and the
western lands as immediate crises, with the lands seen as the means to
pay national debt for the war and for future development.98 Some
states, not just the "land-poor" ones, argued that the western lands
were obtained with the blood of all the colonies' citizens and these
lands should pay the pressing war debt. These lands were needed for
the union to fulfill its promise to the enlistees in the revolutionary
% HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 21 ("[Blecause American politics finds both deep consensus
and significant conflict in the same sources, agreements are a primary generator of disagree-
ments and, simultaneously, the basis for 'resolving' those disagreements.").
05 Id. at 20.
Id. at 22 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE chs. 4 and 5 (1986)).
97 Id. at 23.
98 See RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 25-26.
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army that they would be rewarded with land. Many worried that the
financial and political advantage in the new states to emerge should
not accrue to the eight states that claimed the western lands.99 Addi-
tionally, the quality of people who were invading and setting in the
frontier lands fed a northeastern fear of westerners. They were
stereotypically depicted as squatters, ignorant and not likely to be-
come productive citizens. This view opposed Thomas Jefferson's
that land should be given to actual setters who would be productive
and capable of self-government. °1 The Articles form the first formal-
ized instrument to make practical the perspectives that became la-
beled as the Federalist and Antifederalist.
B. Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union
The Articles' vision of the democratic republic favored local or
state power over the national, which was ultimately rejected in the
Constitution. The Articles continue "to have a vital but unrecognized
role in America's political foundations. A fuller and more satisfactory
understanding of the perplexities of America's formative political
principles requires that the implicit be made explicit."1 2 Central in
this analysis is the western lands and the authority in Indian affairs,
though other issues were enmeshed. Other issues, such as small
states versus large states and proportional or equal representation in
Congress, coalesced with the hopes and fears about what would be
done with the western lands. Yet, no matter how partisans argued
about state size and representation (which are not the focus of this
paper) and other issues, all advocates ultimately agreed on the lesson
and principle after the Confederation experience. Namely, that the
national government, not the states, would have authority over the
99 See MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE
CONFEDERATION 1781-1789, at 9 (1950):
The struggle continued without a break after the start of the Revolution. It affected the
fighting of the war. It was a major issue in creating the Articles of Confederation and de-
layed their ratification for years. It warped the course of diplomacy. It shaped a good
deal of the political and constitutional history of the Confederation.
100 See id. at 358 ("The emigrants to the frontier lands are the least worthy subjects in the
United States. They are little less savage than the Indians; and when possessed of the most fer-
tile spots, for want of industry, live miserably.") (quoting Timothy Pickering in letter to Rufus
King, 4June 1785, id. at 358 n.15 ).
101 See id. at 353-54 (noting that in 1784 the Congress of the Confederation appointed Tho-
mas Jefferson as chairman of a committee to draft an ordinance for the government of the new
public domain). Jefferson's vision of how responsible settlers given land could progress to
statehood resulted in the Ordinance of 1784. However, it was repealed in the Ordinance of
1787 when land speculators and their supporters substituted congressional control, not local
self-government, in the frontier. While both approaches used national power, rather than state
power, the interests being served shifted to the private profit sector. Id
102 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 27.
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western lands and relationships, hopefully peaceful ones, with the
Indian nations. The struggle to reach this resolution is story behind
the formal Constitution. 
10
The Articles manifest connective strands that a simple state versus
federal power dichotomy does not allow. The newly independent
states, forced to rebel against the constrictive national power of the
crown over local communities, were determined to prevent a federal
power that would be similarly despotic. The states viewed local com-
munity as the source of governmental power. Anchored in local rela-
tionships and homogeneity, it is the small republic of Montesquieu's
philosophy that the colonists embraced.'O° The terminology in the
drafts and final product is of friendship, mutuality, and communal-
it.105ity.
1°
The concept of community guided the construction of the Arti-
cles, with individual rights as a lesser focus that emerged forcefully in
the subsequent Constitution. In the states were the values and as-
sumptions of covenanted communities; a national community was
problematical. The state constitutions served as models to both the
Articles and the Constitution; moreover, they offered alternative vi-
sions to federal constitutionalism.' 6 Donald Lutz states that "[i] n late
1775 the Continental Congress instructed the states to draft constitu-
tions that would 'establish some form of government' independent of
the Crown.' '10 7  State constitutions were products of "a time of ex-
03 See generally JENSEN, supra note 99, at 350-59 (discussing the creation of the national do-
main).
104 See WOOD, supra note 34, at 356 ("Americans were well aware of the prevailing maxim,
made famous by Montesquieu-indeed it was basic to their thought in 1776-that only a small
homogeneous society whose interests were essentially similar could properly sustain a republi-
can government.").
105 See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 1777, art. III, in U.S.C. at XLVII (2000):
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other,
for their common defence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general
welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks
made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other
pretence whatever.
106 See Marsha L. Baum & Christian G. Fritz, American Constitution-Making: The Neglected State
Constitutional Sources, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 199 (2000) (arguing that six years before the
formation of the federal Constitution, comprehensive compilations of existing state constitu-
tions provided models for the framing of fundamental law in the new states and for the federal
constitution); Christian G. Fritz, Alternative Visions of American Constitutionalism: Popular Sover-
eignty and the Early American Constitutional Debate, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 287, 289 (1997) (ar-
guing that federal constitutionalism is a tradition distinct from the state constitutions that em-
braced a more expansive view of popular sovereignty as compared to the federal constrained
view of the people's right to alter or abolish their government). But see L=TZ, supra note 37, at
97 ("One should not conclude that the state constitutions were the inevitable product of what
came before or that the United States Constitution was simply a composite of state docu-
ments.").
107 LUTZ, supra note 37, at 100. However, three of the states chose to continue their colonial
charters. Id.
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traordinary political experimentation and innovation"; in the 1776-
1798 period, the first sixteen states wrote a total of twenty-nine consti-
tutions. 08 The local level, according to Hoffert, afforded the maxi-
mum level of meaningful self-definition not possible in a national
membership.' 9
The national frame should be a community of allies, constructed
to protect the state communities' interest in friendship and mutuality
in their intercourse. Here Vattel, read by many colonial Americans,
proved influential with his view that "several sovereign and inde-
pendent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confed-
eracy without each in particular ceasing to be a perfect state ....
The deliberations in common will offer no violence to the sovereignty
of each member."... In individual and joint actions as allies, the states
claimed authority from their inherent sovereignty. How this author-
ity would be delegated to the national Congress in the Articles ener-
gized long-standing disputes.
The first draft of the Articles apportioned the explicit powers and
duties between the states and Congress, the embodiment of the na-
tional government, in a "model balanced much like that of the Con-
stitution of 1787.""' Less explicitly developed than the Constitution's
balance of the two forms of power, the first Articles' draft was the
work of John Dickinson of Delaware, which drew on an earlier effort
by Benjamin Franklin."' In July 1754 commissioners of the northern
colonies met in Albany where Franklin drafted the Albany Plan of
Union to correct "our disunited state, and our weakness arising from
such want of union." 3 Then the theoretical balance of power in the
Dickinson model was reworked so that the states held the fundamen-
tal authority, limiting Congress to specific grants of power. Eighteen
subject matter areas were reworked to shift strength to states, includ-
ing Indian affairs and the Western lands."4 Congress had a second
108 Id. at 97. See generally id. at 96-110 (categorizing the state constitutions by their chronol-
ogy, e.g., the "first wave" and "second wave" produced fifteen new state constitutions after the
1775 order of the Continental Congress and before the end of the war actions in 1782).
109 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 35-36.
110 WOOD, supra note 34, at 355 (quoting EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR
PRINCIPLES OFTHE LAWOF NATURE §§ 10, 67 (London 1759, 1760)).
III HOFFERT, supra note 65 at 85.
112 Benjamin Franklin, Reasons and Motives for the Albany Plan of Union (July 1754), re-
printed in 1 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUION 210 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
The plan was to be submitted to Congress, and three pages of the plan were dedicated to the
problems arising from the western land and relations with the Indians for land, trade, and
peace.
13 Id. See generally Clinton, supra note 72, at 1089-1104 (including a substantial discussion of
the Albany plan and the supporters and resisters of centralizing policies that would limit state
actions).
114 HOFRERT, supra note 65, at 85. Some other major areas were reconstructed to keep state
power as the control: the nature of the union, interstate comity, maritime jurisdictions, and
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draft by August 20, 1776, where the contentious subject matter was
reduced to four issues."
5
Control of the western lands with the embedded Indian relation-
ships proved the most acrimonious arena in this struggle where sov-
ereignty was at stake. "Would it be plural-centered in each state-
or singular-centered in Congress?" As Onuf remarks, "Every state
depended on the guarantees of state rights written into the Confed-
eration. But landless and landed states alike resisted leaving the de-
termination of western claims to future adjudication .... The west-
ern lands controversy thus became inextricably bound up with the
terms of the union itself.""' 7 In the framework of Merrill Jensen's
classifications, the "conservatives favored a single sovereign with 'su-
perintending' power over states and citizens," while "radicals" trans-
ferred to this political struggle their animus against the Crown's "co-
ercive centralized power" with its colonial governing class and
economic elites."" The state-focused "radicals" enjoyed theoretical
support in the Declaration of Independence and the experiences of
all the colonists under the domination of the British form of central-
ized government." 9 The resulting framework structured the power to
favor the states, yet provided for national subject matter and proc-
esses delegated to the centralized government. The final draft of the
Articles, on November 15, 1777, did not resolve the western lands
and Indians issues, which roiled in confrontations among the states
and delayed ratification until March 1, 1781.
The final provisions manifest an architectural design that is para-
doxical by structuring power in multi-layers that defy a simple state or
federal categorization. In Article II, "Each State retains its sover-
eignty, freedom and independence, and every power, jurisdiction,
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to
military powers granted to a proposed Council of States, to function when the full Congress was
not in session. Id.
15 Id. at 85-86. The four included
the equal representation of all states in Congress, the basis for the apportionment of
common expenses, the grant of powers to the central government over western lands,
and the distribution of power between the states and Congress to define the precise loca-
tion of sovereignty. This last issue was resolved quickly but pointedly. Formal coercive
authority was to be located in each individual state.
Id. at 86.
116 Id. at 87.
117 ONUF, supra note 92, at 14.
11 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 87-88 (citing JENSEN, supra note 69, at 20). Contra Freedman,
supra note 93, at 804-809 (challenging Jensen's thesis that the drafting of the Articles was fo-
cused on oppositional factions, labeled as radical and conservative).
19 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 87-88.
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the United States, in Congress assembled. 2 ' Then Article XIII pro-
vides that: "Every State shall abide by the determinations of the
United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them. And the articles of this con-
federation shall be inviolably observed by every State and the Union
shall be perpetual .... A truncated design then addressed the
practicalities of how authority would be used in specific areas. The
document articulates powers that are distinct for the states and the
national entities and of powers that are integrated. However, the
power of Congress was a dependent version of state power, for exam-
ple, requiring super majority votes in Congress for presumably na-
tional subject matter, such as coining money and setting its value.'2
State powers were described in the affirmative mandatory acts and
then in prohibitions. The prohibited acts were both absolute (e.g.,
no imports or duties that interfere with United States treaties)123 and
conditional (e.g., prohibited from entering foreign treaties, though
the full Congress can consent and authorize this for states). 124 The
powers delegated to Congress-the only form of national govern-
ment-included sole and exclusive rights or powers (e.g., to deter-
mine peace and war)'25 and those of last resort on appeals.26 The Ar-
ticles created a central legislative government, with an administrative
mechanism (not an executive branch) and implied judicial-like fo-
rums. Each State was allocated one vote in Congress12 and a Com-
mittee of the States would sit during the congressional recess.1 28
Quasi-judicial processes were invested in Congress, first in that a
State could petition Congress when a controversy existed with oppos-
ing states. Boundary and jurisdiction disputes were exclusively re-
served for this process. 1' Then a set of procedures would allow the
states a voice in selecting the judges to hear the dispute; the decision
would be sent to Congress. In response to contested land claims of
states and the private parties who obtained title from a State, contro-
versies concerning "the private right of soil" would also be decided by
120 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 105, art. II, U.S.C. at XLVII. See also HOFFERT,
supra note 65, at 199 (quoting the same text from the reproduction of the Articles of Federation
and Perpetual Union found inJOURNALS, November 15, 1777, 9:907-25).
121 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 105, art. XIII, U.S.C. at L.22 Id. art. IX, at U.S.C. XLVIII-L. For purposes of this paper's focus on the Indian issues, the
structure and powers in the Articles will be summarized.
123 Id. art. VI, at U.S.C. XLVIII.
124 Id.
12 Id. art IX, at U.S.C. XLVIII.
12 Id. at U.S.C. XLVIII-XLIX.
Id. art. V, at U.S.C. XLVIII.
12 Id. art. IX, at U.S.C. XLIX.
129 Id.
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Congress.'3 The entire body served as the last resort of appeal in the
land controversies involving states or individuals.'
The divisive force of the western lands and Indians shows in the
truncated authority that was supposed to contain and discipline inter-
state controversies. Equally lacking was a rational form of central
authority to which states consented. The decision pathway included
diversions that created uncertainty in how some problems would be
handled.3 1 Congress had the sole and exclusive power to "regulat[e]
the trade and managiement] all affairs with the Indians not members
of any of the states, provided that the legislative right of any State
within its own limits be not infringed or violated."' Congress had
the sole and exclusive power of determining war and peace," which
included the relations with Indians. Again, the states wedged an ex-
ception to make conditional the state prohibition:
No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the United States
in Congress assembled, unless such State be actually invaded by enemies,
or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by
some nation of Indians to invade such a State, and the danger is so im-
minent as not to admit of a delay, till the United States in Congress as-
sembled, can be consulted.'35
This provision reflects the collateral fear for safety on land obtained
from Indians and in trade with them, though it contains a counter-
factual presumption. Non-Indians trespassing as squatters or with ti-
tles obtained from speculators and states were the reality in the fron-
tier areas, the western lands. It was the invasive offenses of land-
hungry non-Indians that political leaders feared would trigger wars
that the confederation could not bear militarily or financially.
Ratification of the Articles was protracted as Virginia insisted on
vast land over which it claimed sovereignty and other States resisted.
New York, a State with land claims, ceded western land claims to con-
gressional jurisdiction, while Virginia merely reduced its claim ini-
Id.
1' Id.
132 See Clinton, supra note 72, at 1104-47 (including an extended discussion of the struggles
with states as Congress attempted to implement a national policy). Clinton notes that
"[o]bviously the Indian affairs clause of Article IX originally was intended to have a more lim-
ited meaning than that advanced by some of the most vociferous state opponents of centraliza-
tion of Indian affairs powers." Id. at 1103. Clinton provides details of the states' independent
acts in Indian affairs, interference in treaty making, attempts to legally construct Indians as
members of the states so that state jurisdiction could be extended in contrived compliance with
Article IX, and ultimately, the Indian wars unilaterally initiated by the states of Virginia and
Georgia, plus conflict with the Cherokees in North Carolina.
I" ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, supra note 105, art. IX, at U.S.C. XLIX.
I'M Id. at U.S.C. XLVIII.
I3 Id. art. VI, at U.S.C. XLVIII.
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tially. "' However, the land-poor States of Maryland, Delaware, and
New Jersey opposed the state jurisdiction over questions of the west-
ern lands in a matter affecting the entire union, a position that also
served the interests of land speculators. The land speculators con-
stantly trolled the political shoals of Congress where they believed
they could obtain better deals than in state legislatures. Thus the
ratification was held hostage.'37 Then Virginia voided the land claims
of individuals from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey whose ti-
tles originated with land companies. Virginia also voided all direct
land purchases from Indians within the area of Virginia's charter
claims. is
The States had to reach some solution so the union could start its
"perpetual" life. International relations added complications as
Spain and Britain were exploiting the union's disunity for their own
goals that would undercut the United States' interests.' 9  Virginia
made its conditional land cession in January 1781; it would cede
lands to congressional jurisdiction. However, on these lands, Virginia
extracted the condition that individual purchases of land from Indi-
ans must be voided. Subsequently, Maryland, the last holdout to
unanimity, ratified the Articles that went into formal effect on March
1, 1781.' "Virginia and her supporters had triumphed over Frank-
lin, Dickinson, and their friends in withholding from Congress, un-
der the Articles, the control of the Western lands. Under that in-
strument Congress could not interfere in the matter of state
boundaries except through an elaborate system of arbitration ....
Governing under that instrument was the challenge awaiting the
Confederation.
13 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 94.
137 Id. at 91 (explaining that ratification of the Articles was delayed by concern among some
states over other states' western land claims).
1s8 See id. at 92; see also id. at 90-94 (describing the sequence of events in which opposing
states held to tough positions). Again, the participation of noteworthy founders is woven in
these events. Thomas Jefferson, Richard Henry Lee, and George Mason of Virginia all took
active roles in opposing the land schemes of the land-poor states. In this pre-ratification period
when Virginia was being pressed to cede land to Congress, in 1780 James Wilson, George
Morgan, Benjamin Franklin, and others petitioned Congress to exercise its sovereignty and ig-
nore Virginia's offers of conditioned cessions. They wanted Congress to act and confirm the
land claims of speculators in Pennsylvania and Maryland.
1s9 Id. at 94-95. Some states, for their own gains, proposed that Spain be rewarded for its
support during the revolution by assuring Spain that it, not the United States, would have an
empire in some part of the Western lands. Hoffert notes that this reward for Spain would also
have provided it full navigational rights on the Mississippi River. In this same environment Vir-
ginia was influenced by the British control in the South, whose interests were served by keeping
the confederation from achieving an integrated union. See BAILEY, supra note 69.
140 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 94.
141 ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 365.
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C. Governance in the Confederation Period
The Articles framed a practical structure as the response to exi-
gencies of the Revolutionary War. Peter S. Onuf, in his historical
analysis, places this experience in the developmental context that ul-
timately restrained state power:
The early constitutional history of the United States was shaped byjuris-
dictional struggles within and among the states. Territorial controversies
continually threatened to undermine the war effort. Large states-and
some small ones too-were beleaguered by separatists who jeopardized
their contributions to the common cause. The Articles of Confederation
were not adopted until 1781 because of seemingly intractable differences
over control of the western lands. Despite these portents, the United
States did not collapse. Indeed the territorial controversies illuminated
the limits of state power in early American thought and practice. 142
Making the structure of the Articles work in the everyday life of the
new republic proved to be a daunting challenge.
Between 1776 and the ratification in 1781, the Continental Con-
gress and the thirteen states had been governed, in a de facto man-
ner, by the standards of the Articles. The ratification made de jure
the conduct of the nation's military, economic, and political affairs.
4
1
Ratification, however, did not dissipate the struggle over the western
lands. Always there were speculators pushing at political cleavages as
congressional committees worked on the land issues. Efforts to re-
strict Virginia's land claims to end at the Alleghenies were caught in
the delays in agreeing to the precise terms of the cession, while Vir-
ginia continued to sell land beyond the Alleghenies.
Many saw the control of the western land and its potential income
as essential to a central government; they had to be firmly reserved
for the national needs. George Washington, no longer commander
of the army, warned that squatters and speculators created a constant
risk of war with the Indians when unauthorized persons invaded the
western lands. They prevented the officers and soldiers of the revolu-
tionary army from obtaining the land promised to them if they signed
up for the duration of the war. While Congress and Virginia debated,
unauthorized settlers, often called "banditti," were unrestrained. Ac-
cording to Washington, unless measures were enacted immediately:
[O] ne of two capital evils, in my opinion, will inevitably result, and is
near at hand; either that the settling... [of] the Western Country will
take place, by a parcel of Banditti, who will bid defiance to all Authority
while they are skimming and disposing of the Cream of the Country at
the expence [sic] of many suffering Officers and Soldiers who have
142 ONUF, supra note 92, at 3.
143 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 92-95.
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fought and bled to obtain it... or a renewal of Hostilities with the Indi-
ans, brought about more than probably, by this very means.144
The Virginia cession with its terms was accepted on March 1, 1784,
and the design for administering the land and Indian issues could
start.
Congress tried to establish some order in the administration of
the western land and Indian issues. It issued a proclamation on Sep-
tember 22, 1783, similar in objectives to the Crown's in 1763, to pro-
hibit unauthorized settlement or purchase of Indian lands. That
non-Indian trespassers and squatters could provoke a war was central
in the national government's statement. The prohibition was
essential to the welfare and interest of the United States as well as neces-
sary for the maintenance of harmony and friendship with the Indians,
not members of any of the states, that all cause or quarrel or complaint
between them and United States, or any of them, should be removed and
prevented .... I"
In describing the Indians as "not members of any of the states," Con-
gress further constrained state authority over Indian lands and the
Indians themselves.
The Committee on Indian Affairs was headed by James Duane,
who had corresponded with George Washington about the critical
need to prevent war with Indians in the activities on the western land.
Duane's Committee issued reports in October of 1783 that outlined
the procedures for dealing with the Indians in the North, West, and
the South. Duane reminded that American Indians had also been
aggressors and had not stayed neutral during the War. However, the
Committee urged "clemency" so that the Confederation would not
push the Indians into the political arms of the British who would
benefit in the fur trade. Lines of property "should be ascertained
and established" between the United States and the Indians. All
trade with Indians be regulated by Congress so that "violence, fraud
and injustice" toward Indians would be prevented. Indian anger
about abuses in both areas, land and trade, could trigger a war.146
The advocates for state power and a central government assumed
that the land would be obtained from the Indians, but now Congress
had to focus on the means, making treaties. Surveying and the ad-
ministrative structure could not begin until the Indians' land was
144 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in DOC:UMFNTS
OF THE UNITED STATES INDIAN POLCY 2 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1989). As an officer, the
Commander of the Revolutionary Army, Washington would benefit from land in the frontier
area, and he went on to accrue great wealth. See a/soJENSEN, supra note 69, at 352.
145 PROCLAMATION OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS (Sept. 22, 1783), repinted in PRUCHA, su-
pra note 144, at 3.
146 REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON INDIAN AFFAIRS (Oct. 15, 1783), reprinted in PRUCHA, supra note
144, at 3-4.
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conveyed. Thus a series of treaties with Indians began as part of the
Confederation's policy for the western lands. 147  Besides appointing
commissioners to secure treaties, Congress established two depart-
ments for administering the legislative regulation of relationships
with the Northern and Southern tribes.1 4 "There was no alternative
to treaty-making except to kill the Indians, an alternative which the
westerners tried their best to carry out.
149
The new union's leaders saw treaties as the critical tool to obtain
land and peace with the Indians."5 ° George Washington urged a prac-
tical public policy with two elements. First, the tribes who supported
Great Britain in the war for independence must be treated with gen-
erosity, not retaliation, despite being a "deluded people" in their par-
tisanship during the war. 151
[W] hen I am called upon to give an opinion upon the terms of a Peace
proper to be made with the Indians, that I should go into the formation
of New States; but the Settlemt [sic]. of the Western Country and making a Peace
with the Indians are so analogous that there can be no definition of the one with-
out involving considerations of the other... I repeat it, again, and I am clear
in my opinion, that policy and oeconomy [sic] point very strongly to the
expediency of being upon good terms with the Indians, and the propri-
ety of purchasing their Lands in preference to attempting to drive them
by force of arms out of their Country .... 5'
Second, Congress enacted orders to restrain the lawless inhabitants,
squatters, who defied both Congress and the Indians. Congress
raised troops and sent them to the frontier area to remove the "ban-
ditti whose actions are a disgrace to human nature."'5 Congress had
147 See COHEN, supra note 55, at 59-62 (discussing national Indian policy after the Revolution-
ary War and the treaties); ABERNETHY, supra note 23, at 316 (listing treaties in the 1784-1785
period).
148 COHEN, supra note 55, at 62 (describing the jurisdiction of the two Indian departments).
149 JENSEN, supra note 99, at 357 (referring to the options Westerners had in getting Indians
to give up their land claims).
150 COHEN, supra note 55, at 59-62 (describing the post-Revolutionary War policy of using
commissioners to negotiate boundary lines and to conclude peace with the tribes).
151 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), reprinted in PRUCHA, su-
pra note 144, at I (describing an American policy of generosity). See COHEN, supra note 55, at
59 (explaining that initially the Continental Congress instructed its commissioners that tribes
aiding the British had forfeited their territory as a result of the American victory, but this policy
was not fully carried out).
152 Letter from George Washington to James Duane (Sept. 7, 1783), in PRUCHA, supra note
144, at 2 (emphasis added).
153 JENSEN, supra note 99, at 357 (citing II WILLIAM H. SMrrH, THE ST. CLAIR PAPERS 4
(1882) (quoting John Armstrong, an officer who removed the settlers)). In 1785, Congress or-
dered the settlers/squatters to stay south of the Ohio River. Resistant settlers returned and re-
built their burned out cabins; they fought both the soldiers and the Indians. South of Ohio, the
Kentuckians (unauthorized settlers/squatters) carried on a bloody struggle. Between 1783 and
1790 perhaps 1,500 Kentuckians were killed and no one knows how many Indians or squatters
north of the river lost their lives. See id. at 357.
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to create conditions favorable to successfully making and enforcing
treaties.
Treaties demonstrated the union's policy that recognized the sov-
ereignty of the tribes and their ownership of their lands. The rela-
tions and diplomacy of international law enabled these transactions,
not presumptions of conquest and discovery. The Shawnee, the most
important tribe in the area, boycotted a treaty signed at Fort
M'Intosh in 1785. Consequently, a second treaty was negotiated at
Fort Finney in 1786 where the Shawnee ceded some land claims.
15
Diplomatic courtship was necessary to achieve the relationships that
Washington had advocated to establish peace and friendship and to
obtain land cessions.
Congress enacted a series of ordinances to govern in the West.
The Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs, passed by the
Continental Congress in 1786, included elements such as licensing
and regulating persons who would trade with Indians that also occur
in the later Trade and Intercourse Acts. 55  Thomas Jefferson, who
brought the Virginia cession to Congress, was made chairman of the
committee to draft the ordinance for the administration of the new
public domain.' 56 With his belief in agrarian democracy, he wanted
the land to be given to settlers, not sold to speculators. Productive
settlers would eventually pay their share of the national debt. Jeffer-
son then proposed a plan dividing the land into districts whose in-
habitants would enjoy self-government, which would, by formulated
steps, become states1 57 Jefferson's architectural views, with few
changes, became the 1784 Northwest Ordinance. Continuing his de-
sign to survey and form townships for public and private purposes,
which would generate some income from sales, Jefferson prepared
the 1785 Northwest Ordinance. Then Jefferson left to replace Ben-
154 JENSEN, supra note 99, at 357. Treaty with the Wiandots, Delawares, Chippawas, and Otta-
was, January 21, 1785, 7 Stat. 16 (reproducing the 1785 treaty). Treaty with the Shawanoes,
January 31, 1786, 7 Stat. 26. Variance in spelling of names of Indian tribes is not unusual.
155 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENrAL CONGRESS, 31:490-93 (Aug. 7, 1786), reprinted in PRUCHA,
supra note 83, at 8-9. Besides establishing an Indian Department with Southern and Northern
districts of operation, the Ordinance required the Superintendents of the districts to warn tar-
geted states "whenever they shall have reason to suspect any tribe or tribes of Indians, of hostile
intentions." Id.
15% JENSEN, supra note 99, at 353.
157 Id. at 353-54 (describing the conditions under which the districts would become states).
When the "territory had 20,000 people, they would hold a convention, adopt a constitution, and
send a delegate to Congress. When the population equaled the free inhabitants of the smallest
of the thirteen states, it could be admitted to the union as an equal partner.") Besides a com-
mitment to the central government, a new state would have to pay its share of federal debt,
maintain a republican form of government and exclude slavery after 1800. The prohibition of
slavery was dropped from the Ordinance of 1784 when passed.
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jamin Franklin as the United States minister to France before the
1785 Ordinance was enacted.""
The political pressure of land speculators and the need for na-
tional revenue prevailed in Congress and reversed Jefferson's demo-
cratic design in the 1784 ordinance and 1785 proposed act. In the
terms of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the land would be sold,
with certificates to discount the price to the army veterans, and Con-
gress would appoint a governor and other officials.'-" Critical in rela-
tionships with the tribes, the Ordinance promised that the federal
government would observe the "utmost good faith" towards the Indi-
ans and that Indian lands would never be taken without tribal con-
sent.' 6° Thus, with these moral and legal promises to the Indians, the
Confederation's national government asserted it was in charge of In-
dian relationships and land issues.
Before considering the drafting of the Constitution, one must ad-
dress the facile judgment that the Articles were a total failure, which
caused their abandonment in the Constitution of 1787. The
achievements of the Confederation do not fit such a narrow judg-
ment. Some areas of success have been acknowledged in the earlier,
long established analysis of Gordon S. Wood and more recent study
by Robert Hoffert. In 1776 few would have envisioned and articu-
lated how the thirteen fiercely independent colonies could become
one republic. Wood comments that for the Confederation, the de-
gree of union achieved was truly remarkable. 16' Among the achieve-
ments in state relations are the equality of the citizens of all states in
privileges and immunities, the reciprocity of extradition and judicial
proceedings, and the elimination of travel and some discriminatory
trade restrictions. 162
At the federal level, the substantial grant of powers to Congress in
Article IX, setting out sole and exclusive powers, made the league of
states cohesive and stronger than many citizens would have ex-
pected."' The unified strength was essential for a new nation simul-
taneously involved in the international relations necessary to win the
war and building a union. Since 1776 the national governance,
through the Continental Congress, had "contracted offensive and de-
fensive alliances with France, established independence, financed the
158 Id. at 354.
Id. at 356-58.
160 Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 3, in 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS,
340-41 (July 13, 1787), reprinted in PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 9-10.
161 WOOD, supra note 34, at 356-59 (commenting that the interests and qualities of the people
in the states seemed so different that a Union was unlikely).
162 Id. at 359.
1 I d.
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War of Independence, established and administered an army and
navy," and succeeded in its war with England.'64
In the Confederation period, the divisive issue of the western
lands retained its virulence. In the changed political climate, appeals
to citizens as the sovereign, the "people" as the source of power in-
voked since the Declaration of Independence, led to disorder as well
as responses to restore social order. For those fearful for the future
of the United States, the achievements of the Confederation proved
insufficient in the face of problems that imperiled the union.
D. Disorder as the Prelude to the Constitutional Convention
The states' exercise of power under the Articles shifted political
strength to favor the centralists or federalists as state legislatures cre-
ated unstable business and political conditions while denying to the
federal government the promised state responsibility to fund and
administer the union. The congressional power that had been sub-
stantial and essential in the war years disintegrated. States' delegates
failed to meet the necessary quorum so that "Congress had virtually
ceased trying to govern."1' With peace at hand, the states turned in-
ward to their own sovereignty and jurisdictional powers. There were
multiple areas of state malpractice, but the Western lands were the
coalescing issue.
"The states had become increasingly jealous of their power and in
fact through their handling of public lands and public debts were fast
moving" to dominate the political and economic space and contain it
within state sovereignty.' 66 The states had drafted and ratified consti-
tutions that emphasized accountability to people, practicing republi-
canism at its most local level. Yet these same legislatures extended
their powers to eviscerate the executive branch, often the weakest in
their state designs, and the judicial powers by closing or disempower-
ing the courts. Vermont, for example, had seceded from New York
during the war for independence and its breakaway conduct dis-
rupted the states' unity during the war and in the Confederation.
16
1
Continuing in its fierce autonomy, the Vermont legislature became
"the court of chancery in all cases over £4,000, interfering in causes
between parties, reversing court judgments, staying executions after
judgments, and even prohibiting court actions in matters pertaining
164 HOFFERT, supra note 65, at 97-98.
165 WOOD, supra note 34, at 359 (noting that by the mid-1 780s Congressional power had pre-
cipitously disintegrated).
166 Id. at 361.
167 RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 165. See id. at 245-46, 286 (pointing out persisting factional con-
flicts fed by the Vermont issue). Despite its behavioral autonomy, Vermont was not formally
admitted as a state until 1791.
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to land titles or private contracts involving bonds or debts, conse-
quently stopping nine-tenths of all causes in the state.
"168
Debtor relief laws legitimized breaches of contract and under-
mined commerce and the credit of individuals and the states in a"chain of debt" that extended through the states. Proliferation of
paper money that immediately lost its value led to laws outlawing
creditors' refusal of its tender; creditors demanded gold or silver in
these uncertain times. Every level of economic actor was caught in
this cycle of unpredictable events: the subsistence farmers, small mer-
chants, financiers, and banks in the United States and in London, so
that ferment within the states created the pathway to abandon the Ar-
ticles. Overseas creditors demanded payment from U.S. businessmen
who then pressed their debtors; the Republic's financial relations and
agreements with other nations were at risk. In the Confederation
years when Jefferson was minister to France, a major creditor, he de-
scribed his position as "an excellent school of humility."' 9 Because of
the American debt to France, Jefferson wrote "We are the lowest and
most obscure of the whole diplomatic tribe."170
Probably the most significant of the chain reactions was Shays'
Rebellion of debt-pressed farmers, led by former Revolutionary War
Captain Daniel Shays in 1786.'17 To avoid losing their property or go-
ing to prison, the Shaysites took up arms and aggressively marched
through Massachusetts. They shut down courts, beat lawyers, judges,
and merchants as they staged raids that made "mob rule" more than
a metaphor.'7 Congress, with no army and no money, could not
quell the rebellion; neither could the State. Eventually the rebellion
was put down by a militia financed by businessmen.1
7
1
M WOOD, supra note 34, at 407.
169 BAILEY, supra note 69, at 63.
170 Id. at 64 (commenting that France probably preferred a United States too weak to pay its
debts to one that might break away from French influence). See also id. ("[Tihe Paris regime
was determined to cash in on these expenditures to by using the United States to promote
French schemes in the New World.") However, U.S. debt was conspicuous and Bailey reports
that rumors spread in the diplomatic circles that France might take a part of Rhode Island as
payment. Id.
171 See DAVID P. SZATMARY, SHAYS' REBELJON: THE MAKING OF AN AMERICAN INSURRECTION 19
(1980); Curtis P. Nettles, The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775-1815, in 2 ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1962).
172 THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 31, at 141-42 (Shays began his armed
challenge to the State when his band of insurgents confronted the Massachusetts militia sent to
protect the State Supreme Court in September 1786. Shays' band forced the court to adjourn.
Then, with another insurgent leader, Luke Day, in December of 1786 they assembled a rebel
force of 1,200 men who outnumbered the state militia. The Governor had to call for a short-
term mobilization to assemble 4,400 men to deal with the insurrection, which unsuccessfully
attacked the federal arsenal in Springfield. It took until the end of February 1787 for the upris-
ing to be suppressed.).
173 FRED BARBASH, THE FOUNDING: A DRAMATIC ACCOUNT OF THE WRITING OF THE
CONSITUTION 38 (1987) (providing ajournalist's succinct account of these events).
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Shays' [] Rebellion, as seen through the eyes of frightened contemporar-
ies, provided a powerful image of America after its fall from political
grace. Shays himself became the exemplary antihero, the type for dissi-
dent leaders elsewhere [in the states] .... The conditions that had made
Shays' [] ascendancy possible were present everywhere and would become
progressively more acute.' 74
The rebellion became a national event because it offered a model for
domestic dissidence in every State. Then, Shays' Rebellion spilled
into neighboring states where Shaysites created disorder and under-minedpublc "" 175
mined public confidence. Wood terms this crisis as more than "li-
centiousness leading to anarchy-which was a comprehensible abuse
of republican liberty, but also a serious shattering of older ways of ex-
amining politics and a fundamental questioning of majority rule."
17 6
The foundation of the new republic was insecure.
The Federalists opportunely used the disorder to compile the sins
of the States in writings that were recycled in the Federalist Papers.
In April 1787 James Madison compiled the "Vices of the Political Sys-
tem of the United States.' ' 7 7 Leading his list was the failure of the
states to comply with the "Constitutional requisitions" of the Articles,
an "evil [that] has been so fully experienced both during the war and
since the peace, results so naturally from the number and independ-
ent authority of the States."' 8 After concluding that the States' fail-
ures would be fatal to the confederation, Madison moved to the en-
croachment by the States on the federal authority. "Examples of this
are numerous and repetitions may be foreseen in almost every case
where any favorite object of a State shall present a temptation.
Among these examples are the wars and Treaties of Georgia with theIndians. ' 79
In his recent history Paul Johnson has summarized the recurring
problems and the inevitable conclusion:
174 ONUF, supra note 92, at 177. See also id. (reporting that James Wilson of Pennsylvania as-
serted that Shays' Rebellion revealed "on what a perilous tenure we hold our freedom and in-
dependence").
75 See WOOD, supra note 34, at 325-26 (noting the discontentment of people throughout the
states); ONUF, supra note 92, at 178-79 (explaining the gravity of the rebellion).
176 WOOD, supra note 34, at 411-13. See also id. at 465:
Not only the fact of the rebellion itself but the eventual victory of the rebels at the polls
brought the contradictions of American politics to a head, dramatically clarifying what
was taking place in nearly all the states. Urging people to obey the laws of their state
governments as a cure for anarchical excesses of the period seemed to be backfiring, re-
sulting in evils even worse than licentiousness.
See also ONUF, supra note 92, at 177-81 (noting there was a "diaspora" of Shaysites into other
states).
in James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787) in THE
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[I] ndividual states carried out all kinds of sovereign acts which logically
belong to a central authority-they broke foreign treaties and federal
law, made war on Indians, built their own navies, and sometimes did not
trouble themselves to send representatives to Congress. They taxed each
other's trade while failing to pay what they had promised to the Congres-
sional coffers. That, of course, was at the root of the collapse of credit
and the runaway inflation. All agreed: things could not go on this way.'8
Onuf points out that domestic dissidence was not the only threat;
foreign powers were eagerly awaiting the opportunity to exploit divi-• • 181 ..
sion among the Americans. With these perilous conditions all po-
litical actors, previously opponents on the western lands and the
framework of the Articles, at this time agreed that change was manda-
tory.
Whether to amend the Articles or make a total systemic change
separated the Federalists and Antifederalists; experiences since the
Articles injected disturbing, real-life content into philosophical dis-
agreements. The Antifederalists, including Richard Henry Lee and
George Mason, rejected the vicious state politics that their philo-
sophical position, in some sense, bound them to defend. "Antifeder-
alists failed to reconcile arguments drawn from theory with argu-
ments drawn from experience.,,181 "The Federalist victory.., was
actually more of an Antifederalist default."'183 According to Wood, the
latter lacked coordination and unified leadership, a marked contrast
to the energy and effectiveness of the Federalists, who also were rela-
tively youthful. l 4  "We had no principle of concert or union," la-
mented one South Carolina Antifederalist."8 The Federalists mar-
shaled formidable talent and influence. They had the speakers in the
states' legislatures, large and small, with oration skills that surpassed
many of the Antifederalists. Moreover, the Federalists enjoyed the
180 PAULJOHNSON, A HISTORYOF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 183 (1997).
181 ONUF, supra note 92, at 179 (noting the fear of counterrevolution orchestrated by Great
Britain).
182 Id. at 193.
193 WOOD, supra note 34, at 486.
184Id. at 484-85.
185 Id. at 486 (quoting Aedanus Burke). Madison's description of the Massachusetts Antifed-
eralists fit across all the states: "There was not a single character capable of uniting their wills or
directing their measures .... They had no plan whatever. They looked no farther than to put
a negative on the Constitution and return home." Id. at 486, citing Letter from James Madison
to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 19, 1788) in 5 WRITNGS OF MADISON 101-102 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1900). Wood also posits that the Antifederalists were not simply poorer politicians than the
Federalists, "they were actually different kinds of politicians. Too many of them were state-
centered men with local interests and loyalties only, politicians without influence and connec-
tions, and ultimately politicians without social and intellectual confidence." Id.
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support of the newspapers, a critical source in an age where ordinary
citizens were literate and politically engaged.
186
In the construction of the new model of government, the Antifed-
eralists should not be dismissed as "losers." Their conceptual contri-
butions, including the amended Bill of Rights, made the Constitution
a covenant better fitted for the times and the experience of the "peo-
ple," the sovereign proclaimed since the Declaration of Independ-187
ence. The Antifederalists' fear of excessive power of a remote gov-
ernment over the lives of individuals also resonated with the
Confederation experiences. The Antifederalists raised questions that
deserved serious consideration and forced the Federalists to justify
the new ideas to be embodied in the Constitution.' The challenge
of how to structure the changes in the power of the States and the
central government remained.
E. Constitutional Finale: Exclusive Federal Power in Indian Affairs
Curing the domestic and international jeopardy of the republic,
undeniable because of the anarchical experiences since the Articles,
meant exclusive federal authority was the only viable principle for the
Western lands and Indian affairs. The Federalists harped on the dis-
order-social, legal, and economic-to push for a systemic reforma-
tion, not just an amendment of the Articles:
More than anything else the Federalists' obsession with disorder in
American society and politics accounts for the revolutionary nature of
the nationalist proposals offered by men like Madison in 1787 and for
the resultant Federalist Constitution. Only an examination of the Feder-
alists' social perspective, their fears and anxieties about the disarray in
American society, can fully explain how they conceived of the Constitu-
tion as a political device designed to control the social forces the Revolu-
tion had released. "9
The Federalists feared uneducated, greedy lesser men who grasped at
power in politics and business, now described as the "scum" who had
plunged the States and the union into a depression aggravated by vio-
186 Id. at 486-87 (describing the Antifederalists who lacked speaking expertise, some were
accused of using ghostwritten speeches because of their literate shortcomings). Of the hun-
dred some newspapers printed in the late 1780s, only a dozen supported the Antifederalists be-
cause of fear of offending the merchants who could retaliate. Merchants had suffered losses in
the laws suspending or burdening the collection of debts. The newspaper columns were closed
to the opposition. Id. See RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 145-46 (discussing the difficulty in gaining
access to the press for Antifederalists).
187 RAKOVE, supra note 44, at 142-53 (describing the Pennsylvania Antifederalists as mounting
an organized campaign to educate via public gatherings and newspapers about their vision for
the Constitution). See id. at 153-60 (discussing the Federalists' approach to the Constitution).
188 Id. at 149.
189 WOOD, supra note 34, at 476.
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lence and anarchy. t Greedy land speculators, who had exploited the
weaknesses of the Articles, became some of the enemies who would
continue to plunder the union.
Financial need, aggravated by accelerating inflation, led Alexan-
der Hamilton and his allies to propose what would become the "fed-
eralist solution."' 9' Paul Johnson states that Hamilton's "Continental-
ist Letters," published in 1781-82, where he advanced his ideas, "was
the beginning of the debate on the Constitution. ' 92 Money to oper-
ate a national government, with land to be obtained from Indians as a
primary source, was a preoccupation of the new republic since the
1783 Peace of Paris ended the war with Britain. This treaty, by add-
ing the Crown's western territories, doubled the geographical size of
the United States. The Articles did not deal successfully with the land
and the financing of the republic.
Robert Morris, Hamilton's ally, was the Superintendent of Finance
for the national government and his push for reform sparked the
constitutional drive. In 1781-82 he proposed a program of tax and
finance that would provide funds and a stable currency. 193 The efforts
of Hamilton and Morris did not result in reform. In 1783, James
Madison entered this arena when he proposed a reform plan and
made an opportunity out of a conflict between Virginia and Mary-
land.' 9t The two states were fighting over control of navigation on the
Potomac, allowing importers opportunity to evade customs dues. A
conference at Mount Vernon, with George Washington as a concilia-
tor, went beyond settling the disagreement to address customs, cur-
rencies, regulation of credit, and other topics.' 95
The Mount Vernon conciliation led to Madison's successful mo-
tion in Congress for a conference for all States in Annapolis in Sep-
tember 1786.19 Only five States sent their commissioners. However,
this event allowed Madison to work with Hamilton, who melded his
190 Id. ("'When the pot boils, the scum will rise,' James Otis of Massachusetts had warned in
1776, but few Revolutionary leaders realized just how much it would rise."). See generally WOOD,
supra note 34, at 471-518 (discussing the difficulty for the Federalists to persuade that their phi-
losophy was not British elitism based on wealth, social rank, and titles of nobility). The Federal-
ists urged that the elite of a republic could be anyone who acquired the attributes of social su-
periority: education, experience, wealth, and connection and thus became eligible for political
leadership. d. at 479-80.
191 JOHNSON, supra note 180, at 180. Hamilton served as George Washington's executive offi-
cer during the Revolutionary War. Id. at 181. A federal government needed honest currency
and a framework in which the economy could develop and expand with an advanced banking
system, managed credit, and promotion of fiscal efficiency. Id.
192 Id.
193Id. at 181-82.
194 Id. at 184-85.
195 Id. at 185.
196 Id.
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vision with Madison's to seek a more comprehensive plan of reform.
On February 21, 1787, Congress endorsed the resolution of the An-
napolis Conference to call all States to send delegates to Philadelphia
in May 1787. The charge for Philadelphia: "to devise such further
provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitu-
tion of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the
Union."' 19 7 This call to Philadelphia set no limit on the subjects the
Convention might address.
The Convention continued the interstate struggle in the proposals
for the national legislature that would assure fair and appropriate
power, and the "test" issue for the models was Indian affairs. The de-
sign of the national legislature would differ from the Confederation
model of one chamber with equal representation for all States. At
the Philadelphia Convention, on May 29, 1787 Edmund Randolph
introduced Madison's Virginia plan, which advocated a bicameral leg-
islature where States would be represented proportionately.' 9 Subse-
quently, on June 15, the small States introduced the New Jersey Plan,
that opposed proportional representation in both chambers of a bi-
cameral legislature.'9 On the same day, the Convention debated
"whether to amend the Articles of Confederation or draw up an en-
tirely new framework for a national government."2 On June 19, the
Convention delegates voted to develop the type of constitutional gov-
ernment proposed in the Virginia Plan, with efforts to resolve the
representation issue. On July 16, Roger Sherman presented the
Connecticut Compromise, ultimately adopted, that had proportional
representation in the House and equal representation in the Sen-201
ate. The legislative proposals were measured by their potential to
handle a critical list of subject matter, including the matters involving
Indians.
Indian matters were the touchstone because it was uncontested
that exclusively federal power would apply to this subject matter.
Thus, relations with Indians provided a recurring test for whether a
proposed plan for the new government would cure the ills of the un-
ion. The questions were more about how to properly structure and
express the matter. In Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, there are recurring accounts using Indians as the test, affirming
197 Id.




201 Id. at 143.
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the consensus to preserve relations with Indians for the federal gov-
ernment.
20 2
In debate considering the NewJersey plan, Madison examined the
plan and whether "it promises satisfaction" in eight concerns. 2 ' First,
will the plan "prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Trea-
ties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of for-
eign wars? ''2°1 Second, "[w]ill it prevent encroachments on the fed-
eral authority? A tendency to such encroachments has been
sufficiently exemplified among ourselves .... By the federal articles,
transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs [sic]. Yet in several
instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them."' °5
Madison questioned whether the New Jersey plan could preserve the
union and provide a government that would remedy the "evils felt by
the States." 0 His questioning and testing is picked up in the notes of
Rufus King and Robert Yates, who point out that Georgia, in direct
violation of the Articles of Confederation, made war and concluded
treaties with the Indians. °7
In the Record of the Convention and journals of observers, the re-
lations with Indians became a matter of drafting and style rather than
of substance. On August 18, the journal shows affirmative action on
the proposition, vesting the federal legislature with power "[t]o regu-
late affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the
United States."2
Upon Madison's motion the item was sent to the Committee of
Detail for final drafting. Madison's own notes for this period in
August reflect a heated debate on slavery, whether to permit it and, if
so, whether to tax the trade in slaves. In contrast to the Indians,
slavery remained the divisive issue it had been since the drafting of
the Declaration of Independence. After the work of the Committee
of Style, the final text enumerated for Congress the power " [t] o regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes., 210 The Journal of the Convention shows
211only changes of style of capitalization and where to put commas.
3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 548 (Max Farrand ed., 1966)
(commenting on the lack of debate about federal power in Indian relations).
203 1 id. at 313-25 (including entries forJune 19, 1787).
2 Id. at 316.
MId.
2W Id. at 315-16.
207 Id. at 326, 330.
M 2 id. at 321, 324 (including journal for Saturday, August, 18, 1787).
Id. at 220-23.
210 Id. at 655.
21 Id. at 367, 529, 595, 655 (comparing quoted text with the final text in Committee of
Style).
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By its very existence, the Indian Commerce Clause demonstrates
the unique role that tribes as nations played in constructing the
foundations of the Constitution. Reconstructing a new allocation of
power between the States and the federal governments required that
the Convention focus on what was absolutely required if the new un-
ion was to succeed. Relationships with the Indian nations were res-
cued from the Confederation morass that endangered the survival of
the nation. The authority for Indian affairs appropriately became a
touchstone for testing the proposals before the Convention. As
Frank Pommersheim has noted,
The Indian Commerce Clause by its own terms acknowledges Indian
tribes as sovereigns, sovereigns other than states for which the federal
government needs delegated authority to regulate. Broad as the author-
ity conferred in the Indian Commerce Clause might be, it cannot include
the right to annul or otherwise unfairly limit the right of tribes to exist
and to exercise reasonable authority within their borders. 2
As the culmination of the national experiences, the new republic es-
tablished a governmental model that clearly intended no role for
States in Indian matters.
In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall relied on the constitutional
principles in Articles I and II, adding the power on treaties, war and
peace, with the Indian commerce clause, to "comprehend all that is
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the Indians. 21 3 In
combination with the Supremacy Clause, these powers constitute a
foundation preclusive of State jurisdiction. "The treaties and laws of
the United States contemplate the Indian territory as completely
separated from that of the States; and provide that all intercourse
with them shall be carried on exclusively by the government of the
Union. '214 A clearer statement of foundational principle would be
hard to find. The subsequent statement by the Marshall Court that
the Cherokee nation is a distinct community, occupying its own terri-
tory, with boundaries accurately described, expresses the political
quality that made tribal nations the parties to treaties so essential to
the formative U.S. 2 5 The practical consequences of such a unique
political relationship only with the federal government were then
captured as the Court completed its analysis. "IT] he laws of Georgia
can have no force, and... the citizens of Georgia have no right to
enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in confor-
mity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress." ' From founda-
212 FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY
TRIBAL LIFE 121 (1995).
213 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
214 Id. at 557.
215 Id. at 559.
216 Id. at 561.
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tional principle to immediate practical consequences, the Court un-
derstood and articulated the constitutional design of the Framers.
To construe otherwise would have arrogantly ignored the entire con-
stitutional experience and the substantive commitment to rescue the
union.
The parts of the constitutional foundation each have a saliency.
The Indian Commerce Clause reflects the original intent that Con-
gress would regulate the relations with American Indians. However,
the Supreme Court distended this concept to Congressional plenary
power, a seemingly absolute authority over Indians that lacks a consti-
tutional foundation."' "In a constitutional republic premised on the
authority of limited sovereigns and the consent of the governed, fed-
eral doctrines of plenary power and unilateral abrogation of tribal
authority are clearly extraconstitutional and ought to be considered
beyond the scope of national authority. '' 11 As Robert Clinton re-
minds, the Indian Commerce Clause empowered Congress with
authority to conduct bilateral relations, not to manage the affairs of
Indians.19 The war power and accords that resolved the Indian wars
are not just historical artifacts, but are still part of modern-day rela-
tionships. Geronimo's Chiricahua Apaches surrendered to the
United States and eventually were imprisoned at Fort Sill, Oklahoma,
where they and their descendants remained as the last Indian prison-
ers of war until 1913.20 Their descendants today rely on the under-
standings that formally ended the state of war between the United
States and the Apaches, and the impact of that event is part of the life
experiences of contemporary Fort Sill Apaches. 221  Today, treaties
with tribes provide a legal foundation for vindicating the rights of the
Indian nations. A treaty, under established constitutional law, "may
endow Congress with a source of legislative authority independent of
217 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (announcing the plenary authority of Con-
gress over tribal relations).
21s POMMERSHEIM, supra note 212, at 120.
219 See Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1056, 114247
(1995).
2W DEBO, supra note 85, at 232-35. War and its impact on modern life remained part of the
life of the Fort Sill Apaches. Prohibited from returning to Arizona, they were given the choice
of remaining in Oklahoma or joining the Mescaleros in New Mexico. Contemporary life in-
cludes an awareness of war because of relationships with elders, as all children born at Fort Sill
were born as prisoners of war until 1913. The last child born as a prisoner of war was the clan
mother, Mildred Cleghorn (1910-1997). The first free-born child was the late artist, Alan
Houser (1914-1994). These two individuals marked the historical boundaries of war and peace
and enriched the lives of many with their knowledge, talents, and generosity of spirit.
21 SeeANGIE DEBO, GERONIMO: THE MAN, HISTIME, HIS PLACE (1976).
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the powers enumerated in Article I (although, of course, still limited
by the Constitution's explicit constraints on federal action) .... 22
In the absence of constitutional amendments that significantly al-
ter the powers vested in the federal government, the foundational
provisions continue as the sources for retained federal power that ex-
cludes state jurisdiction. Whatever the claims that States made for ju-
risdiction, inherent or from another source, they were terminated in
the constitutional construction needed to save the union. Moreover,
in the shared authority of the executive and legislative branch there is
no role for the Court to make policy or regulate intercourse with
American Indians.
V. IMPLEMENTING THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLE TO EXCLUDE THE
STATES
A. Treaties and the Trade and Intercourse Acts
In the immediate period after the Constitution was ratified on July
2, 1788,2" the federal government used its exclusive power to con-
strain the States via statutes and preemption. Advocates for ratifica-
tion had focused on the overreach or invalid use of state power and
the need to control it.2 24 With the Constitutional framers in the first
set of administrations, Congress acted immediately to strengthen the
foundation laid out in the Constitution. The preoccupation with the




President George Washington, in his annual addresses, returned
again and again to the matter of the western lands, commerce, and
peace with the Indians. 26 However, some States continued to pro-voke violent confrontations with them. In his address in 1795, Wash-
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1127 (2d ed. 1988); see also Mis-
souri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Zn Congress adjourned under the Articles of Confederation on November 1, 1788; the first
Congress under the new Constitution did not convene until March 4, 1789 in New York City.
24 THE FEDERALIST NO. 7 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUrION supra note 177, at 224-26, (arguing for ratification by focusing on four sources of
disunity that caused states to "make war upon each other;" the four sources are: the territorial
disputes of the western lands, commerce competition, the national debt, and violation of the
private contract laws).
5 DEBO, supra note 85, at 74-79 (discussing federal policy after the Constitution was ratified
as a time of peace and war, with treaty making as well as violations of the treaties by the U.S.).
26 George Washington, Third Annual Address, Oct. 25, 1791, in 2 THE FOUNDER'S
CONSTITUTION, supra note 177, at 531-32. On matters tended to during the Congressional re-
cess, "[a]mong the most important of these is the defense and security of the Western fron-
tiers .... [as well as] uniting their [the Indians] immediate interests with the preservation of
peace .... would be as honorable to the national character as contormable to the dictates of
sound policy." Id.
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ington noted, "[t] he termination of the long, expensive, and distress-
ing war in which we have been engaged with certain Indians north-
west of the Ohio is placed in the option of the United States by a
treaty ... 22' The performance of treaties, by Indians and the U.S.,
was at stake. Washington further noted that the Creek and Cherokee
Indians had confirmed their preexisting treaties with the U.S. and
were giving evidence of a
sincere disposition to carry them into effect .... But we have to lament
that the fair prospect in this quarter has been once more clouded by
wanton murders, which some citizens of Georgia are represented to have
recently perpetrated on hunting parties of the Creeks which have again
subjected that frontier to disquietude and danger. .... 2
1 8
The Trade and Intercourse Acts, according to Francis Paul
Prucha, are the basic Indian policies formulated in the first decades
of the Constitutional republic.2 9 While there was policy in the trea-
ties, the shaping of the policy in terms of implementation structure
and rules is in the Acts. These statutes, the first passed in 1790 and
the last in 1834,2 were intended to regulate trade and intercourse
with the Indian tribes and "to preserve peace on the frontier."
231
Prucha states that "[t] he first consideration was peace. 232 The outra-
geous acts committed by non-Indians on the frontier were continu-
ously reported to Congress by Washington and Henry Knox, the Sec-
retary of War in both the Confederation period and the first
Department of War under the Constitution.
The Acts affirmed the treaties, enabled compliance with the trea-
ties, and enforced the Congressional authority to prevent the viola-
tions of federal power that had doomed the Confederation. The use
of Congressional power was important as a message to the tribes with
treaties and those with whom Congress hoped to achieve treaties.
But the laws were not "Indian" laws that regulated Indians broadly,
despite limiting trade and sale of land through the federal monopoly.
The Acts were notice to the States and the lawless non-Indians on the
frontier, and sought to make them behave to prevent violations of
Indian treaties. The enduring power of the Acts to preserve treaties
as binding law has been demonstrated by the twentieth century suc-
M George Washington, Seventh Annual Address, Dec. 8, 1795, in THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, supra note 177, at vol. 2, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 3 (Indians), doc. 7.
Id. See also George Washington, Eighth Annual Address, Dec. 7, 1796, id. at doc. 8;
PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 44 (noting that the Union had only two choices: wars with Indians or
treaties).
PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 1-3, 43-50.
2 1 Stat. 137 (1790); 2 Stat. 139 (1802); 4 Stat. 729 (1834).
23 PRUCHA, supra note 83, at 2.
Id. at 44.
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cess of tribes with land claims, where the land transactions were made
in violation of the Acts.
2 3
The new republic's pursuit of treaties solidified the federal power
to regulate how non-Indians could function on Indian lands. Trea-
ties remained the main instrument with which the Indian nations
could give consent to the relationships with the national government
and when, if at all, non-Indian activities would be permitted by the
tribes. The substance of the treaties certainly respected the tribes'
sovereignty with regards to maintaining a separation between tribes
and States. Equally important was the tribes' authority over all per-
sons within the tribal territory, including non-Indians.
The first major Indian land cession treaty was the Treaty with six
tribes (Wyandots, Delawares, Ottawas, Chippewas, Patawatimas, and
the Sac Nations) at Fort Harmar on January 9, 1789. 2m The Sachems
and warriors of the assembled nations negotiated with Arthur St.
Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, for the United States.
The treaty established a permanent boundary between the tribes and
the U.S.; land was ceded for federal protection and goods. The tribes
released, quit-claimed, relinquished, and ceded lands the Indians
formerly claimed and the U.S. was "to have and to hold the same in
true and absolute propriety forever." '235 The U.S. then relinquished
and quit-claimed all the lands the tribes reserved and retained for
themselves. If the discovery doctrine generated or reserved author-
ity for the U.S., it was not ownership. Rather, it was a preemptive
right of first purchase, as the tribes agreed that
said nations, or either of them, shall not be at liberty to sell or dispose of
the same, or any part thereof, to any sovereign power, except the United
States; nor to the subjects or citizens of any other sovereign power, nor to
237the subjects or citizens of the United States.
The authority over non-Indians was certainly informed by the con-
tinuing concern of the political leadership in the first administrations
over "banditti," "lawless whites," and "wanton murders" on the West-
ern frontier. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, then Justice
2M See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (holding Oneida
County liable for wrongful possession of land, in violation of the Nonintercourse Act of 1793);
Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F. 2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding
that the Nonintercourse Act created a trust relationship with the federal government that was
ordered to file suit to recover land improperly ceded to Maine).
24 Treaty for removing all Causes of Controversy, regulating Trade, and settling Boundaries,
with the Indian Nations in the Northern Department, of the one Part; and the Sachems and
Warriors of the Wiandot, Delaware, Ottowa, Chippewa, Pattawatima and Sac Nations, on the
other Part,Jan. 9, 1789, 7 Stat. 28 (1789).
M Id. at art. II.
236 Id. at art. III. See also WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 4142 (interpreting this
treaty).
237 7 Stat. 28, at art. III.
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Rehnquist treated the tribes' authority under treaties as simply a
means to discourage illegal settlement on Indian lands, not as crimi-
nal jurisdiction by tribes over non-Indians.2m The 1778 treaty with the
Delawares provided for joint prosecution by the Delawares and the
federal government, in a trial mode "fixed by the wise men of the
United States in Congress" with the deputies of the Delaware na-
tion. '9 Treaties in the time of the first Trade and Intercourse Act are
described in Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. "Pun-
ishment of non-Indian offenders under federal laws as a substitute for
direct redress by Indian tribes was promised in most treaties in force
when the first Indian Trade and Intercourse Act was adopted.
24
0
These specific treaty provisions fail to establish that tribes did not
have preexisting or inherent jurisdiction over all actors, Indian and
non-Indian, on their lands. Forbearing to use a right in specific situa-
tions does not destroy its preexistence. Also, the fact that tribes
agreed to substitute or defer to the federal government for the prose-
cution of non-Indians does not construct a case that states thereby
have default jurisdiction.
In the Confederation period, a series of treaties including the
treaty at Fort M'Intosh in 1785 and the treaty with the Shawnees in
1786, had provisions that any U.S. citizen attempting to settle on In-
dian territory would forfeit the protection of the federal govern-
ment.2 41 In the Treaty of Fort M'Intosh,January 21, 1785 (Wyandotte,
Delaware, Chippewa, Ottawa Nations), the provision stated:
If any citizen of the United States, or other person not being an Indian,
shall attempt to settle on any of the lands allotted to the Wiandot [origi-
nal spelling] and Delaware nations in this treaty, except on the lands re-
served to the United States in the preceding article, such person shall
forfeit the protection of the United States, and the Indians may punish
him as they please.
24
2
The critical relationship with the Indians was affirmed after the Con-
stitution was ratified with the Treaty of Fort Harmar, signed by the
governor of the Northwest Territory, General Arthur St. Clair. It re-
newed the Treaty of Fort M'Intosh on January 2, 1789. Thus peace
with the Ohio Indians, located in the contested frontier area, was
0 435 U.S. 191, 202 n.13 (1978).
'N Id. at 199 n.8 (citing Treaty with the Delawares, art. IV, 7 Stat. 14).
240 COHEN, supra note 55, at 111. See generally id. at 109-17 (discussing the Trade and Inter-
course Acts).
241 Id. at 60 (citing Treaty of Fort M'Intosh,Jan. 21, 1785, art. 5, 7 Stat. 17; Treaty with Sha-
wanoes, Jan. 31, 1786, art. 7, 7 Stat. 27). Similar provisions are found in the treaties at
Hopewell, including the Treaty with the Chickasaws, Jan. 10, 1786, art. 6, 7 Stat. 24, 25; Treaty
with the Choctaws, Jan. 3, 1786, art. 6, 7 Stat. 21, 22; and Treaty with Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785,
art. 7, 7 Stat. 18, 19.
242 PRUCHA, supra note 144, at 6.
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pursued by the federal political branches. Other treaties with a simi-
lar provision include the Hopewell treaties with the Cherokees, the
Chickasaws, and the Choctaws.
43
These treaties do not support the assumption stated in Oliphant
that Indians generally had no authority over non-Indians on tribal
territory. Tribes also expressly agreed in treaties to deliver Indian
and non-Indians who committed "capital" crimes to the United
States, to be tried under federal law. However, this pragmatic
choice did not expressly remove the tribes' jurisdiction over lesser or
misdemeanor crimes, such as those in Oliphant. Subsequently, in a
parallel model, the Major Crimes Act of 1885, deprived both tribes
and States of criminal jurisdiction over felonies in Indian country.
245
The American Indian nations in their treaty agreements used the
conserving and innovating abilities that enabled their historical con-
tinuity in the face of changing environments. The tribes were resist-
ing the political and military aggressiveness of States that defied the
constitutional rule that relations with Indians would be exclusively
federal. Given the many fronts and forms of assaults on the tribes, it
is understandable that tribes would agree to substitute federal power.
If the federal government would rein in the recalcitrant States, this
would reduce contentious interactions with non-Indian governments.
Political alliances and their necessity were part of the tribes' ap-
proaches in relations with other tribes as well as the Europeans.
"Indians did not, as historians too frequently have written, have 'an-
cient' or 'traditional' enemies. Each group surely had its allies and
enemies, but such relationships were neither permanent nor neces-
sarily long-lived. Alliances changed and animosities withered or
flared, both before and after European contact. ''247 The tribal world
had changed; American Indians were being outnumbered by the
growing Euro-American population248 and were being overwhelmed
243 See id. at 7; COHEN, supra note 55, at 60, n.86; see also Clinton, supra note 72, at 1113-35
(describing the state objections to treaty-making with these provisions and interference with the
federal treaty commissioners). Resisting states, especially in the South, pursued their own pol-
icy on Indian relations, trade, and war. For example, Virginia raised a force to make war on
neighboring tribes in 1786 and Georgia unilaterally went to war with Creeks in 1787.
Treaty with Cherokees, arts. 6, 7; Treaty with Choctaw, arts. 5, 6; Treaty with Shawnee, art.
3; Treaty with Chickasaw, supra note 241, arts. 5, 6.
245 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000).
24 See ANGIE DEBO, THE ROAD TO DISAPPEARANCE: A HISTORY OF THE CREEK INDLANS 3-36
(1984) (discussing political and military alliances, and describing the government and formida-
ble military power of the Creek Confederation before arrival of the Europeans ); Peter Iverson,
Native Peoples and Native Histories, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST 13, 15 (Clyde
Milner et al. eds., 1994).
247 Iverson, supra note 246, at 15.
24B Estimations of the population of the American Colonies between 1630 and 1780 show the
total population within U.S. borders (not counting Indians) as increasing from 4,600 in 1630 to
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by the proximity of Euro-American communities to the tribes' pre-
contact territories. In dealing with change, tribes resorted to their
pattern of learning from others and then constructing ways to live
productively.
In the popular imagination American Indians are peoples at some
set point in time despite their historical flexibility in keeping custom-
ary values while learning from new experiences. Peter Iverson 249 and
Clara Sue Kidwell2 5' are among the scholars who have described the
adaptive abilities of indigenous peoples to assess their contempora-
neous condition and use new ideas, as well as animal and plant forms.
Iverson mentions the ability to transfer old ways to new places while
at the same time picking up improved methods to build houses, grow
crops, etc. "Their flexibility carried over into the post-contact period,
when many groups incorporated European technology into their cul-
ture. ''25' Absorbing new influences does not necessarily mean decay
or diminution of a culture. Ultimately, indigenous peoples have
maintained continuity through change. "By adaptation, experimen-
tation, and trial and error, they discovered what worked and what did
not.''252 The process of adoption, adaptation, and then appropriation
into tribal culture is evident in ideas of government, as demonstrated
in the experiences of the Cherokees and other tribes.253 Thus, the
lessons of past unsuccessful experiences with the States made the
treaties mutually beneficial for the two nations, the tribe and the fed-
eral government.
When the Constitution was first implemented and the federal
government prosecuted the non-Indian offenders of capital crimes or
felonies and withdrew its protection from unlawful settlers, treaty-
specific tribes benefited. In return the federal government obtained
peaceful relations, land cessions, and diminished the strength of
competitor foreign nations in land and commercial trade. All of
2,780,400 in 1780. WORLD ALMANAC EDUCATION GROUP, THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOKS OF
FACTS 376 (2002) (citing source as the Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce).
249 Peter Iverson, Taking Care of the Earth and Sky, in AMERICA IN 1492, supra note 51, at 85.
Clara Sue Kidwell, Systems of Knowledge, in AMERICA IN 1492, supra note 51, at 369.
251 Iverson, supra note 246, at 16 ("[B]efore the introduction of European technology, the
American Indian West was a place of progress and innovation. The challenges faced by the
people living there-the altitude, the wind, and the aridity-highlight the economic and cul-
tural success enjoyed by many native societies.").
252 Id. See also Gloria Valencia-Weber, Tribal Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L.
REV. 225, 256-61 (1994) (discussing customary belief systems and innovative approaches that
incorporated ideas and life forms through adoption, adaptation, and ultimate appropriation
into the tribal culture).
253 See id. at 256-61 (discussing conservational and innovative practices, including the Chero-
kee and Creek development of tribal governments after contact with Euro-Americans); see also
Arrell M. Gibson, Constitutional Experiences of the Five Civilized 7Tibes, 2 AM. INDIAN L. REV. Winter
1974, at 17, 17-45. See generally ANGIEDEBO, AND STILL THE WATERS RUN: THE BETRAYAL OF THE
FIVE CIVILI7ED TRIBES (1940).
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these interests were centered on controlling what would happen in
the western lands. In the twentieth century in Oliphant v. Ququamish
Indian Tribe, American Indian governments were at another point in
how they exercised jurisdiction, not formally ceded or extinguished,
over non-Indians.2m
B. Enabling Acts for Territories and States, and Disclaimers in State
Constitutions
The disclaimer clauses of enabling acts for new territories and
States and in State constitutions are an under-appreciated body of law
manifesting exclusive federal power. Again, the western lands are the
context out of which this law regime arises. The disclaimers define
the jurisdictional lines between tribes and non-Indians as well as
States and the federal preemptive power. Affirmative law strength-
ened the boundary reserving Indian affairs for the national govern-
ment. Unambiguously, the States were prohibited from engaging in
the unrestrained unlawful power of the Confederation period. In
Indian law cases, this body of acts has been under-utilized, though the
Tenth Circuit has issued a decision reminding States of the intended
preclusive effect.! Yet, if one looks at the continuing and consistent
congressional pattern, the intent and the provisions make clear the
preclusion of States in matters reserved for tribes and the federal
government. The equal footing doctrine was tailored in these new
States to fit the express regime of Congress to preclude State jurisdic-
tion.
The disclaimers used a similar approach that specifies in terms of
assurance to the tribes that territories or States will not, without fed-
eral consent, interfere with tribal nations' internal affairs. An act
precedent, such as treaty modification, anchors the federal consent.
Wilkins and Lomawaima provide a helpful historical analysis of the
pattern and substance of these disclaimers.256 The disclaimers were
intended to keep the territories and resulting States from interfering
with the property rights of American Indians and Alaskan Natives and
from regulating and taxing tribal lands and trust lands within Indian
O2liphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 (1978) ("Of the 127 reservation
court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to
extend thatjurisdiction to non-Indians.").
255 In Indian Country, U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987)
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Oklahoma argument that its enabling act, be-
cause of variance with the enabling acts for North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Wash-
ington, authorized jurisdiction over Indians, their lands, and property. Id. at 979. Moreover,
Oklahoma's early statehood claim of jurisdiction lacks authorization from Congress and has
been rejected by federal and state courts. Id. at 980.
25 WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 176-215.
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country. Essentially, the States had to disclaim title to and jurisdic-
tion over tribal territory as the requisite for entering the union cre-
ated on that constitutional principle.
The territorial enabling acts, with Indian disclaimer clauses, re-
flect the historical struggle over who had title to and authority over
Indian lands in the western lands. Wilkins and Lomawaima chart
twelve specific acts. 25 The Wisconsin act of 1836 and the subsequent
acts, ending with Oklahoma's territorial act of 1890, are consistent in
a number of ways. First, all state that Indian rights will not be im-
paired until extinguished by a treaty.2 Then, the Kansas Act of 1854,
Nebraska Act of 1854, Colorado Act of 1861, and Montana Act of
1864 state that Indian lands will not be included in the territory with-
out tribal consent. 259 The territorial statutes that arose in the western
lands (except Alaska) were the touchstone in the creation of constitu-
tional principles. The statutes were another foundational notice to
the States from the central government. "Federal lawmakers were
warning territorial residents and leaders not to interfere with the
treaty-based political relationship between the tribes and the federal
government. ''26 The central government was also affirming that trea-
ties were the main tool for obtaining tribal consent in the federalist
scheme. Unlike the territories that became States, the tribal govern-
ments would not have representatives in Congress as the means for
consent.
Congress seemed less amenable to creating new States as rapidly
as it created new territories in the western lands. The lingering con-
cerns about the civil qualities of the western settlers remained; mov-
ing these residents from federal governance to self-governance re-
quired consideration. Ten of the eighteen western States had
disclaimer clauses in their enabling acts. Some minor variability ex-
isted; for example, Wyoming and Idaho were admitted to statehood
without enabling acts as their territorial governments eagerly
launched statehood campaigns and constructed constitutions that
Z7 Id. at 181 tbl. 1. The territories with Indian disclaimer clauses in their enabling acts were:
Wisconsin (1836); Iowa (1838); Oregon (1848); Washington (1853); Kansas (1854)'; Nebraska
(1854); Colorado (1861); North Dakota (1861); Idaho (1863); Montana (1864); Wyoming
(1868); Oklahoma (1890).
259 Id. at 180.
25 Id. at 181 tbl. 1.
Mo Id. at 189. Wilkins and Lomawaima note that five territorial acts in areas with many in-
digenous peoples did not have express disclaimers: New Mexico (1850), Arizona (1863), Michi-
gan (1805), Alaska (1854), and Minnesota (1844). Id. at 190.
261 Id. at 182 tbl. 2, 191. The ten states were: Kansas (1861), North Dakota (1889), South Da-
kota (1889), Montana (1889), Washington (1889), Utah (1894), Oklahoma (1906), New Mex-
ico (1910), Arizona (1910), and Alaska (1958).
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complied with federal policy.262 Their State constitutions included
disclaimers. In general principle, the enabling acts repeated the
boundary setting to restrict the States from interfering with how
tribes and the federal governments handled matters within the in-
digenous territories.
The State constitutions are the frameworks for state and local gov-
ernment and do the "fill-in" of subject matter and authority not cov-
ered in the federal constitution. The state and local authority are ex-
press in each State's organic instruments. The authority of the
federal government is by inference, except in the express disclaimers
that were required in matters affecting American Indians and their
lands. "Congress insisted that disclaimer clauses be inserted in eleven
of the eighteen western States' constitutions. '" 26' There is a common
thread in these disclaimers, which repeat much of the substance and
terms of earlier territorial and state enabling acts. Especially note-
worthy, however, is the express statement that all right and title to
264
Indian-held land is subject to absolute federal jurisdiction. Mon-
tana's disclaimer, for instance, included the language, "absolute ju-
risdiction and control of the Congress," while others mentioned the
congressional authority needed to impose taxes on Indian territory.
2 65
Yet States did not lose interest in asserting authority over the west-
ern lands and their campaigns to achieve statehood included advo-
cacy to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over all land, including Indian
lands, within the new state's boundaries. Opportunities for State ad-
vocacy arose once Congress stopped formal treaty-making in 1871
and the Cherokee Tobacco decision of 1871 held that Indian treaties
could be implicitly abrogated by later federal laws. 65 In that instance,
a Cherokee treaty provision exempting sales on tribal land from fed-
eral taxes was pierced by a subsequent federal statute taxing tobacco
produced anywhere within the United States. Colorado, admitted to
the union in 1876, tested the reach of state power in United States v.
McBratney267 in 1881. Although Colorado's territorial act contained a
Id. at 191. Wilkins and Lomawaima also point out that three states admitted between 1861
and 1889, Nevada, Nebraska, and Colorado were not required to have disclaimers in their ena-
blin acts and that the reason why is not clear from the legislative record. Id.
Id. at 194. The eleven states are: North Dakota (1889), South Dakota (1889), Montana
(1889), Washington (1889), Wyoming (1890), Idaho (1890), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907),
New Mexico (1912), Arizona (1912), and Alaska (1959). Id. at 183 tbl. 3.
2 Id. at 183 tbl. 3 (providing key language from eleven state constitutions all of which vest
jurisdiction of Indian lands in Congress).
2 Id. at 183 thl. 3.
26 Id. at 192 (citing Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1871)).
267 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). For a non-Indian against a non-Indian crime on the reserva-
tion, prosecuted in federal court, the equal footing doctrine meant that Colorado acquired
criminal jurisdiction over the whole of its territory, including the Ute Reservation, which de-
prived the federal court of jurisdiction. See also Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240, 243-47
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disclaimer, its state enabling act and constitution did not. Since
Colorado had not expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over the Ute In-
dian reservation, its state law applied for criminal prosecution. Some
scholars cite this Colorado victory as the provocation for Congress'
subsequent enabling acts in 1889 that introduced the language of
"absolute jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United
States.''26 The statutory concern of Congress for its Article I power
over Indian affairs was evident in this response to loss of criminal ju-
risdiction in McBratney.
Congress has insisted on express statutory and State constitution
disclaimers, through the entry of the last State, Alaska, in 1959. At
this time, the indigenous nations' historical experiences had changed
their status and territory because of intervening policies since the
Constitutional period. The tribes persisted despite the devastating
effects from policies of forced assimilation via the civilizing pro-
grams,2 69 loss of land because of allotment,27 ° retribalizing in a Euro-
American model of government in the Indian Reorganization Act,
27'
and termination which was in effect at the time of Alaska's state-
hood.272  Self-determination policy would not start until the early
1960s. Yet Congress insisted on the continuation of the constitu-
tional principle, especially noteworthy in the instance of Alaska where
the Alaskan Natives had long-standing land claims that the Alaska Na-
tive Claims Settlement Act addressed. In the Congressional hear-
ings on Alaska statehood, the disclaimer was explained:
The requirement of a disclaimer clause is a customary feature of acts pro-
viding for the admission of new States into the Union. They are designed
primarily to protect the rights of the native inhabitants of the area being
(1896) (upholding criminal jurisdiction of Montana for murder of a non-Indian on the Crow
reservation, where Montana had a disclaimer clause in its state enabling act and constitution).
Both decisions have been criticized). See, e.g., WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN
A NUTSHELL 128-32 (3d ed. 1998) ("Despite the dubious statutory and judicial underpinnings
for the McBratney and Draper decisions, they have become firmly entrenched in existing law.").
268WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 192-93 (discussing the respective positions of
Glen E. Davies and Michael Lieder regarding the language of the disclaimers).
See THE AGGRESSIONS OF CIVILIZATION: FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY SINCE THE 1880S (Sandra
L. Cadwalader & Vine Deloria, Jr. eds., 1984); ROBERT H. KELLER, JR., AMERICAN
PROTESTANTISM AND THE UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1869-82 (1983) (introducing various
discussions of the United States' policies towards the Indians).
20 DEBO, supra note 85, at 331 (stating that, because of allotment, the Indian holdings de-
clined from 138,000,000 acres to 47,000,000 in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act be-
came the new policy to restore and protect communal land).
271 Indian Reorganization (Wheeler-Howard) Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
2M See generally ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 137-65 (1991) (describing
the uneven history of Federal Indian policy).
27 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (Supp. V 1999).
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admitted to statehood, as well as those of the Federal Government in the
public lands which are not disposed of in the act of admission.274
The hearings included testimonial concern about creating or recog-
nizing Native American rights that federal courts had not recog-
nized as well as Alaskan Natives' concern that their existing rights,
in this instance, would be jeopardized.176 The Alaska legislative proc-
ess and resulting disclaimer should be viewed as Congress telling the
newly admitted State that it must recognize the limits of its powers as
well as the overriding authority of the federal government, in Con-
gress, in Indian affairs.
Despite the language and lineage from territorial acts to State
constitutions, the purpose of the federal regime has been ignored by
the States, the courts, and scholars. 7 Federal law expressly con-
structed for enforcing the constitutional principle in Indian matters
should be revitalized for its foundational guidance when the Court
constructs expansive State jurisdiction:
We argue that a long line of federal and state case law and statutory law
supports the ongoing vitality of state, enabling, and constitutional dis-
claimer clauses as the most "persuasive considerations as to the lack of
state power" in areas such as hunting and fishing rights, taxation, and
civil jurisdiction in Indian Country.
An intact body of law that persistently excludes the States from ju-
risdiction over Indian held territory, the Indian Country, does not ar-
gue for inherent state jurisdiction over the reservation or its mem-
bers. These disclaimers remain largely as passed by Congress and the
States in their constitutions. In Williams v. Lee,279 the Court construed
the Navajo treaty and Public Law 280 (hereinafter PL 280) 280 as a
274 See Alaska Statehood: Hearings on S.50 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
83rd Cong. 227 (1954) (statement of Sen.Jackson) (noting the Department ofJustice's concern
about "giving and receiving a right," and asserting that the Committee wanted only to "main-
tain [] the status quo").
275 Id. (Department of Justice concern about "giving or recognizing a right"). Senator Jack-
son asserted that the Committee wanted only to "maintain[ ] the status quo." Id.
276 Miles Brandon, President of the Anchorage Camp of the Alaska Native Brotherhood testi-
fied on perceived danger to Native land claims in the disclaimer language. Senator Jackson
responded: "The committee has no desire to jeopardize your rights whatever they may be."
Alaska-Hawaii Statehood, Elective Governor, and Commonwealth Status, Hearings on S.49, S.399, and
S. 402 Before Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 84th Cong. 98 (1955).
2n See WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 195-96 (describing silence in scholarly works,
and noting omissions in publications of the National Conference of State Legislatures, specifi-
cally in JAMES B. REED & JUDYA. ZELIO, STATES AND TRIBES: BUILDING NEW TRADITIONS (1995),
and disagreeing with Frank Pommersheim, who in his book Braid of Feathers, argues that dis-
claimers are vague, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAWAND TRIBAL LIFE 142 (1995)).
M WILKINS & LOMAWAIMA, supra note 4, at 197 (citing COHEN, supra note 55, at 116). See also
id. at 282 n.15 (listing examples of such case law).
' 358 U.S. 217, 217-23 (1959).
Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1321-22, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994)).
Jan. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTI UTIONAL LAW
statutory path for a State to obtain jurisdiction denied in a State dis-
claimer. The Court denied State jurisdiction when a non-Indian
creditor sued a Navajo creditor for an on-reservation transaction.
Arizona had not met the requirements of PL 280 to change the pro-
hibition in the State's enabling act.28' Nor could the State pass the
"infringement" test, that is, whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.282
Subsequently in the 1973 case of McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Commission, the Court again construed the State's enabling act and
the State's failure to meet PL 280 requirements, including tribal con-
sent for State jurisdiction.2 84 The Court described a jurisdictional
enigma as the State had conceded that in the absence of PL 280
authority, "the Arizona courts can exercise neither civil nor criminal
jurisdiction over reservation Indians. But the appellee [Arizona] no-
where explains how, without such jurisdiction, the State's tax may ei-
ther be imposed or collected .... [T]he admitted absence of either
civil or criminal jurisdiction would seem to dispose of the case." 285
According to the Court, in making its concession Arizona had "no
choice" because of the precedent in Kennerly v. District Court and
United States v. Kagama.2 6 The Court denied the State the authority to
tax Indians on the reservation, stating "[S] ince the signing of the Na-
vajo treaty, Congress has consistently acted upon the assumption that
States lacked jurisdiction over Navajos living on the reservation." 87 In
McClanahan the Court drew only on the treaty, the enabling act and
PL 280 statutory framework, and not infringement.288 Thus, the
Court fully applied the foundational principle in the regime of ena-
bling acts with PL 280 to exclude State jurisdiction on the reservation
and its members.
The federal enabling regime has not been repealed and a pattern
is not visible of States' energy focused on formally removing the pre-
clusive substance of the disclaimers. 289 The substantive preclusion of
28 Williams, 358 U.S. at 222-23.
Id. at 220.
411 U.S. 164, 177-79 (1973).
284 Id.
M Id. at 178-79.
2B5 Id. at 178 n.19 (citing Kennerly v. Dist. Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); United States v. Ka-
gama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)).
287 Id. at 175.
Id. at 179 ("[W]e reject the suggestion that the Williams test [for infringement] was meant
to apply in this situation. It must be remembered that cases applying the Williams test have
dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians.").
In Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463
(1979), the Court held that amending the state's constitution was not the only way to obtain PL
280 jurisdiction for "option" states not included in the first PL 280 delegation. The "permis-
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State jurisdiction has been applied to lands formerly in the western
lands of the revolutionary period and other lands, e.g., Alaska. This
unrepealed express law needs to be weighed in the process of correct-
ing the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the foundational law
that clearly prescribes a national relationship with American Indian
sovereigns and prohibits State interference. This law could also help
restore the norm that consent of tribes as governments is required
before treaties and prior law are in-effect abrogated by States assert-
ingjurisdiction that is created by the Court.
VI. THE COURT ADDS A NEW LEGAL MICROBE: INHERENT STATE
JURISDICTION
A. Rootless Jurisdiction Outside the Foundational Principle
The contentious historical and legal experiences with the western
lands establishes that inherent State jurisdiction over Indian territory
as a constitutional concept is rootless. The crucible of the western
lands led to the only foundational principle that would secure the
survival of the newly independent United States: relations with Indi-
ans and their lands had to be exclusively federal. Any proffered claim
of inherent State jurisdiction over the Indian lands was continuously
in dispute. States disputed the jurisdiction of other States in the
western lands and there was a conflict between the states and a cen-
tral government in claims to authority in matters involving Indian
lands. Whatever the jurisdiction that some States claimed ended in
the construction of the constitutional republic. Any construct de-
rived outside the resulting constitutional principle is fictional.
The Indians and their lands were simply too critical an issue to
leave to risky idiosyncrasies of the states with their virulent rivalry in
claims to land and jurisdiction extending to the shores of the Pacific.
The interstate disputes put the union in jeopardy in state-declared
wars on Indians, unilateral treaty-making with Indians, and the collu-
sive relations with land speculators greedy for sales in western lands.
During the Confederation the states proved themselves incapable of
resolving their land disputes and of administering in an orderly way
the land issues and other subject matter. Their incompetence thrust
the nation into a crisis. The pre-Constitutional crisis triggered by the
sive" terms of PL 280 only requires positive action, which can be a legislative act in accord with a
state law method if it meets the requisites of the federal statute. Id. at 493. See also id: "If as a
matter of state law a constitutional amendment is required, that procedure must-as a matter of
state law-be followed." The Court's finding about method does not undercut the exclusion of
states from jurisdiction over the reservation and members unless Congress has specifically
authorized.
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western lands involved matters beyond ordinary state jurisdiction. At
stake were the foreign relations needed for stable financial arrange-
ments as well as to prevent foreign states from encroaching into the
territorial interests of the United States.
After the Constitution became operative, the Congress pursued
treaties and statutes to enforce the foundational principle to keep
states out of the subject matter of Indians and their lands. Congress
is the primary enumerated actor for how the federal government ar-
ranged its relationships with Indians. Congress' policies have in-
cluded objectives and means that displeased Indians and states, but
that does not change that the legislative arm, in conjunction with the
executive, is where the Constitution placed this subject area. The
Court simply lacks the authority to discretionarily create Indian policy
that is reserved for the political branches.
Arguing for this foundational principle on Indian matters does
not necessarily force a choice between competing constitutional val-
ues. The framers made the choice in the structure of the Constitu-
tion as to which institutions would be responsible. The Worcester
Court correctly interpreted the principle, respecting the political re-
lationships in the treaties the Court analyzed so that the federal and
tribal relationship was determinative. Thus, the states' laws and juris-
dictional claims could not reach into tribal territory. In this interpre-
tation, the Court exercised the institutional role it proclaimed in
Marbury v. Madison2° to make decisions in accord with the founda-
tional principles. It is not the Court's charge to ignore a constitu-
tional principle because it is inconvenient for the states. States may
intensely pursue subject matter that is, nonetheless, foreclosed to
states by the Constitution, treaties, and the laws made pursuant to
these sources, and the Court must decide accordingly.
Hicks and other cases exhibit the devices of the Court that are un-
disclosed and have destructive potency for the future of American
Indian nations as culturally distinct governments. Worcester v. Geor-
gia,21 despite its flaws, established the unique status for tribes under
the international law of that time. In international law today, the
tribal sovereigns still function as respected states in the law of indige-
nous peoples., 2 International law reflects the respect that the Ameri-
can Indian nations obtain abroad, which inspires indigenous peoples
throughout the world. Ironically, the U.S. law that acknowledged
2W Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
291 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832).
See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1996) (con-
tending that international law continues to develop to support indigenous peoples' rights). See
also GETCHES ET AL, supra note 73, at 975-1055 (discussing the relationship between interna-
tional law and indigenous peoples' rights).
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and sustained the status of tribes as self-governing political bodies is
what the Supreme Court is dismantling. While the international ap-
proach increasingly recognizes and strengthens the autonomy of in-
digenous people as self-governing entities, 93 the Court cannibalizes
its own integrity. In Hicks the Court moved further away from foun-
dational principles and emanating doctrines that, despite repetition,
deficiencies sustained the sovereignty of the tribes.
Even if one agrees with Justice Scalia that "long ago" the Court
departed from the Worcester holding that state law has "no force
within reservation boundaries," the search for principled law re-
mains. His statement that "an Indian reservation is considered part
of the territory of the State" asserts a geographical fact, but that does
not answer the question of where jurisdictional boundaries should
be.25 With state governments, for instance, jurisdictional boundaries
among local governments and regulatory power do not always match
the obvious visual facts of geography. Because constitutional founda-
tions should guide for the long-term, infesting decisions with unprin-
cipled opportunistic ideas make suspect the judicial product.
B. Joining the Collection of the Smallpox Blankets
In Hicks, when the Court again implanted unacknowledged ele-
ments that injure the legitimacy of the Court and of the tribes, it in-
creased the stock of judicial microbes. Inherent state jurisdiction
over Indian territory joins a disturbing list that includes but is not
limited to the following examples.
1. Shift From Enumerated Power of Congress to Judicial Plenary Power
With the enumerated powers in the Constitution, it is possible to
understand a defined form of the plenary power for Congress as full
authority over the matter of relations with the Indian nations. This
would fit the historical and legal experience:
[T] he treatment of the Indian tribes by the national government during
this period strongly suggests that Congress conceived its constitutional
power of "managing all affairs with the Indians" as a power to manage bi-
lateral relations with the tribes rather than a power to manage the affairs
293 See, e.g., CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (§ 35, Rights of the Aboriginal Peo-
ples of Canada), § 35 (affirming the rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada); Treaty of Wai-
tangi Tribunal in New Zealand (providing a forum for recognition of Maori rights and adjudi-
cation of claims for violation of rights under the Treaty of February 6, 1840); Draft
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/1995/2,E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56.
294 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361-63 (2001).
295 Id.
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of the Indians. Consistenly, the Continental Congress dealt with the
tribes as autonomous political units; the treaty format, requiring tribal as-
sent, constituted the most dramatic manifestation of this assumption.2
Congressional power over bona fide content of the Indian commerce
clause, to the exclusion of other federal branches and states, is sub-
stantially different from unlimited power over Indians and any sub-
ject matter.
In a world where the congressional plenar %power created in Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock' lacks constitutional sources, the Court's construc-
tion of its own plenary power over Indians introduces another conta-
gion into the constitutional framework. The Court has seized subject
matter and authority from Congress. This trend includes more than
Indian law subject matter when one considers the trail of cases where
the Court has determined that Congress had exceeded its constitu-
tional authority. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida2 was the "miner's
canary" that Felix Cohen warned was the signal of toxic political cli-
mates.
In Seminole, the Court ignored the unique purpose of the Indian
commerce clause. Thus the Court never addressed whether Con-
2 See CLINTON, supra note 72, at 1142 (describing how Congress viewed its role in relation to
Indian tribes).
27 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (illustrating how Congress has plenary power and can unilaterally
abrogate a treaty, despite the requirement in the treaty for the tribe's consent for a land ces-
sion).
M The vast federal authority and "plenary power" over Indian nations lacks universal accep-
tance. See, e.g., RUSSEL L. BARSH & JAMES Y. HENDERSON, THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND
POLrnCAL LIBERIY 257-69 (1980) (arguing that the Constitution supports the notion that tribes
should be guaranteed the same rights as states); INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, UNrrED STATES
DENIAL OF INDIAN PROPERTY RIGHTS, reprinted in NATIONAL LAVWERS GUILD, RETHINKING INDIAN
LAW 15 (1982) (setting forth the idea that the "unrestrained power over Indians" in the United
States is not "soundly based in law"); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 46-59; Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal Pro-
tection of Indian Autonomy and Self Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 996-1001 (1981) (discussing
the limits of "congressional authority over Indian affairs"); Richard B. Collins, Indian Consent to
American Government, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 365 (1989) (theorizing that American Indian people have
not fully consented to the government, and noting that many scholars have "attacked the doc-
trine of plenary federal power" and its use to control tribal life); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal
Power Over Indians: Its Sources, Scope and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 197-98, 207-28, 236
(1984) (discussing the "genesis of plenary power" over American Indians and its limitations);
Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live With Eurocentric Myopia, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 439 (1988)
(responding in opposition to Professor Lawrence's idea that American Indians need to learn to
live with the plenary power of Congress).
ZJ 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act constitutionally invalid
because the Eleventh Amendment prohibits tribes from suing states in federal court without
their consent). See Justice Stevens' and Justice Souter's dissenting opinions, warning of what
eventually happened in subsequent cases involving congressional acts. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("The majority's opinion ... prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a
broad range of actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.")
See Getches, supra note 17, at 337-39.
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gress had authority under the Indian Commerce Clause for the In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) provision that allowed tribes to
sue the state. IGRA is the most direct form of constitutional power,
under the Indian commerce clause, that demonstrates the founda-
tional principle at work. Previously, in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v.
New Mexico, the Court held:
It is also well established that the Interstate Commerce and Indian
Commerce Clauses have very different applications. In particular, while
the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with maintaining free
trade among the states even in the absence of implementing federal leg-
islation... the central function of the Indian Commerce Clause is to
provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian af-
fairs.
Seminole is only one instance in which the Court has ignored constitu-
tional principles, including its own charge under Marbury, and used
judicial power to bulk up state power.
Before and after the Court began confiscating political power,
Congress passed numerous acts that strengthened the authority of
tribal governments in directional action opposite that of the Courts.
The governmental autonomy of American Indian governments was
strengthened in the self-determination statutes such as the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1988, 30 Tribal
Self-Governance Act of 1994," Indian Health Care Amendments of
1990, 30 5 and the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1991.3 These acts
presume the tribes' abiliVy as governments to design and administer
the necessary programs.
In matters of jurisdiction, Congress expressly excluded state
power and corrected the Court's construction in Duro v. Reina that
301 Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989).
W2 Before Seminole, the Court had found constitutional authority lacking for Congress to pass
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). Then
came the string of cases in which the Court found Congress acted outside its power under the
non-Indian commerce clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Fed. Mar. Comm'n
v. South Carolina Port Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding that the Federal Maritime Com-
mission cannot adjudicate private party complaints against the state because of the Eleventh
Amendment); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that the Americans With
Disabilities Act exceeded Congress' authority under section 5 of Fourteenth Amendment, and
Congress cannot abrogate states' immunity); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(holding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act cannot abrogate states' immunity)
United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that provisions in the Violence Against
Women Act violated the Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment).
25 U.S.C. §§ 450-457 (2000).
25 U.S.C. §§ 450n, 450a(a) note, 450a(a)-450g (2000).
305 25 U.S.C. §§ 1613-1682 (2000).
25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (2000).
W7 For general discussion of Congress passing acts to increase tribal autonomy and govern-
ance, see GETCHES ET AL., supra note 73, at 230-33.
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denied tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians charged with
misdemeanor crimes.3°' Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights
Act in 1991 and affirmed the inherent jurisdiction of tribes to exer-
cise criminal jurisdiction within their reservations over "all" Indians,
using the generic definition used in the Major Crimes Act in the ex-
ercise of federal jurisdiction.3 In the Indian Child Welfare Act of
1978 Congress prescribed how state courts must conduct child cus-
tody proceedings where an Indian child is involved." Moreover, in
the traditional state area of family law, Congress preempted state ju-
risdiction to expressly require exclusive tribal jurisdiction in certain
311situations. Inherent state jurisdiction over Indian lands is counter
to this congressional regime. More disturbing, as a primary concept
it enables the creation of other ideas that are not tethered to consti-
tutional principles.
2. Shift Presumption for TribalJurisdiction to a
Presumption Favoring the State
The Court has shifted prior presumption for a tribe's jurisdiction
over its own territory, if not expressly precluded, to a presumption
against such jurisdiction. In Williams v. Lee, the Court unambiguously
stated, "Congress has also acted consistently upon the assumption
that the States have no power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a
reservation. Significantly, when Congress has wished the States to ex-
ercise this power it has expressly granted them the jurisdiction which
Worcester v. Georgia had denied." 12 In the Court's reversal of presump-
tion an express congressional provision for state jurisdiction is not
required.
495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that an Indian tribe may not assert criminal jurisdiction
over a nonmember Indian).
W9 25 U.S.C. § 1301(4) (2000) ("'Indian' means any person who would be subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States as an Indian under [section] 1153, title 18....").
310 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2000). The requisite trigger for the act to apply is the whether
the child can meet the definition of an "Indian child" in section 1903(4): "[A]ny unmarried
person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligi-
ble for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of any Indian
tribe."
31 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (2000). Exclusive tribal jurisdiction exists when (1) the Indian child
"resides or is domiciled within the reservation" of the tribe, except if jurisdiction has been
vested in the state by existing Federal law, or (2) if the Indian child is a ward of the tribal court,
the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence of domicile of
the child. Id. See also Mississippi Choctaw Indian Band v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (hold-
ing that the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction; under federal law a child takes the domicile of the
member parent, domiciled on the reservation, who arranged the child's birth and adoption off
the reservation).
312 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959). See discussion supra notes 254-288 and accom-
panying text on enabling acts and disclaimer clauses.
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Thus, in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, there is no substanti-
ated inquiry into how tribes lose criminal jurisdiction absent an ex-
press provision in a treaty that the tribe agrees to or abrogation of
such a right is recognized in a treaty. Even with the one treaty with
the Delawares where Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that tribal ju-
risdiction in criminal matters existed, how the Delawares eventually
lost that jurisdictional power is not clear."'
In reversing the presumption, the Court has relied on non-
existent law sources so that one cannot discern a devolution process
that caused the loss of tribal jurisdiction. In Oliphant the Court hark-
ened the 1878 voice of Judge Isaac C. Parker who reigned in the In-
dian territory where tribes had been removed pursuant to treaties.
The tribes' territories were invaded by non-Indians who ignored the
federal statutes and treaties that prohibited unauthorized presence.
The Court assumed that some form of universal law had continued as
in Judge Parker's time, so the Court overlooked the Oklahoma Terri-
torial Act (1890), State Enabling Act (1906), and State Constitution
(1907) with disclaimers." In these laws and their treaties the tribes
were promised federal protection of their treaty and land rights and
exclusion of state power.
Judge Parker's 1878 decision that denied tribal jurisdiction over a
non-Indian was shored up by a short-lived Opinion of the Solicitor
General of the Department of Interior."5 The Solicitor's opinion was
in effect from 1970-1974 and then withdrawn. As ifJudge Parker and
the Solicitor's Opinion are not puzzling enough for those in search
of principle, the Court brought forth other hollow law sources. The
Court offered the proposed Western Territory bill of 1834 that was
rejected by Congress, a nineteenth century "unspoken assumption"
against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, and a 1960 Senate Report
that reflects the "unspoken assumption. 31 6 It is hard to imagine any
subject matter that the Court would cobble together in such an un-
substantiated way that could be regarded as transparent law, yet rea-
soned from a foundational principle. Using "figments" of law cannot
invoke respect for the Court when it uses conjectural construction to
replace foundational principles from the Constitution.
313 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 (1978) (discussing the "one treaty
signed by the U.S. [that] has ever provided for any form of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians").
314 See discussion supra notes 254-288 and accompanying text on enabling acts and on acts
that recognized and revitalized the jurisdiction of tribal governments.
315 Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199 (holding that "to give an Indian tribal court 'jurisdiction of the
person of an offender, such offender must be an Indian,'" which was reaffirmed in 1970 by an
opinion of the Solicitor General of the Department of the Interior).
316 Id. at 201-06 (noting Congress' "unspoken assumption" that "Indian tribal courts were
without jurisdiction to try non-Indians").
Jan. 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Ultimately, the search for a foundational principle and its articula-
tion is futile. There is simply an unacknowledged reversal of the pre-
sumption of tribal jurisdiction in treaties, statutes, enabling acts, and
disclaimers clauses, and the concurrent tribal criminal jurisdiction for
misdemeanors in the Major Crimes Act. Given the silence on how
the state obtained criminal jurisdiction, in Oliphant the state acquired
criminal jurisdiction by default.
Any sovereign-Canada, another state in the union, a distinct
municipality-would have recognized interest and authority to pro-
tect the safety and security of all persons within its boundaries. The
Oliphant defendants were non-Indian residents of the reservation
charged with offenses that are injurious to people and property. As-
sault and high speed racing on a highway on the reservation, ending
in a collision with a tribal vehicle, are not harmless.3 All persons
within the geographical community were at risk and were entitled to
be protected. This regulatory and possibly criminal prosecution is
not a matter of race, citizenship, political membership, or consent in
the political entity within whose boundaries a non-member acts in
prohibited ways. The Court has deviated from long-established prin-
ciples that apply to any other sovereigns so that they can exercise
public policy that protects everyone.
3. Remove Tribal Jurisdiction Without Tribal Consent or Congressional Act
Counter to the Court's general rule against repeal of express law
by implication,318 the Court has both repealed law and created divesti-
ture by implication. In United States v. Wheeler, the Court found that
the tribe had pre-Constitutional jurisdiction over its own members
and that its exercise of criminal jurisdiction along with a federal
prosecution did not constitute double jeopardy.319 Implanted in this
decision upholding tribal jurisdiction over members was the micro-
317 Id. at 210-11. Justice Rehnquist edited text from Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) to
explain the race and cultural disparity between the defendants and the tribe that sought to use
"authority and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and un-
known code ... which judges them by a standard made by others and not for them .... Jus-
tice Rehnquist altered both the text and context of Ex parte Crow Dog, to apply "[t] hese consid-
erations" to the non-Indians in Oliphant. A side-b-side comparison of the Crow Dog text with the
Oliphant version demonstrates substantive dissimilarity, e.g., Crow Dog was a decision based on
the tribe's jurisdiction rather than lack of it. What were the culturally unknown code and stan-
dards that the Oliphant defendants could not know about assault and reckless driving and
speeding? While questions rebound about the wisdom of the tribe to pursue an appeal when
the majority of the reservation's residents and lands were non-Indian, this strategic concern
does not deflect from the requisite for guiding principles for this decision.
318 Discussed in Harjo v. Kleppe, 420 F. Supp. 1110 (D.D.C. 1976), afrd sub nom. Harjo v. An-
drus, 581 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
319 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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bial trap that appeared in Oliphant. Tribes possess the sovereignty
not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or "by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status."320 Moreover, the "areas in which
such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have oc-
curred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe. 3 2' The Court ignored the precedence and
reasoning in Williams and McClanahan that expressly used the foun-
dational principle to exclude state jurisdiction unless Congress
authorized.3 22 Thus the Wheeler decision was infested with toxic ele-
ments that blossomed in Montana v. United States3 23 and Strate v. A-1
Contractors.24
In Montana and Strate, tribal jurisdiction became the exception, si-
lently erasing the prior presumption for tribal jurisdiction in Williams
and McClanahan and the Indian Country statute. " The presumption
of state jurisdiction created in Montana has become the Court's rule,
ignoring its own precedence. Lost in the discourse is the Indian
Country statute, 26 passed in 1948 to solidify tribal jurisdiction in the
checkerboard created by Allotment and other policies. The statute
places in tribal jurisdiction "all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation" notwithstanding any patent and "rights-of-way running
through the reservation. 2 ' The statute also includes within tribal ju-
risdiction all dependent Indian communities and all Indian allot-
ments. Thus, the statute attempted to match the on-the-ground in-
coherence in tribal lands today.
The Indian country statute makes sense as the policies that cre-
ated noncontiguous tribal lands and the consequent jurisdictional
questions were imposed on tribes, generally without their consent. A
statute affirming that tribes have jurisdiction beyond what remains of
the formal trust land borders acknowledges Indian country as it is
experienced in the daily life of many Indians and non-Indians. Inter-
actions between Indians and non-Indians are not an abstract canvas
for the law, but the common and ordinary. The everyday life of peo-
32 Id. at 323.
321 Id. at 326.
See discussion supra notes 254-88 and accompanying text.
3 Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557-67 (1981) (holding that a tribe has no power
to regulate non-Indian fishing and hunting on reservation land owned in fee by non-members
of the tribe).
324 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that "tribal courts may not exer-
cise jurisdiction governing the conduct on non-members driving on the state's highway," even
when the highway crosses over Indian reservation land).
K5 See Krakoff, supra note 17, at 1210-23 (noting the refusal of the Court to grant tribes self-
governing rights); Getches, supra note 17, at 327-36 (discussing the Montana decision's derived
and related cases).
32 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2000) (defining "Indian country" as used in the Act).
18 U.S.C. § 1151.
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pie in Indian country includes multi-governmental boundaries with
varied forms of land tenure and rights-of-ways, all experienced as one
engages in personal and public behavior. The Court affirmed the
Indian sovereign's authority in each tribe's Indian country in Okla-
homa Tax Commission v. Sac and Fox Nation32 8 and Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe2 where the state
stretched its jurisdictional arm to regulate and tax. The Indian coun-
try statute is an express policy of Congress on jurisdiction over the
different types of land within Indian Country. Congress has not
amended it since 1948. The Court has not stated a constitutionally
principled basis why it has tojudicially amend a policy made by the
enumerated political branch."
4. Weaken Tribal Jurisdiction with Ad Hoc Terminology
and New Confusing Rules
The Court has removed tribal jurisdiction by introducing ad hoc
terminology and new rules. Both confuse rather than clarify and add
more uncertainty to Indian law. These new rules arise most easily
when the Court ignores express statutes, treaty terms, prior cases, and
long-standing doctrines.
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
331tzon, the Court adopted the use of "open" and "closed" to distin-
guish areas in which a tribe would be denied or affirmed the author-
ity to zone non-Indian property within the boundaries of the
reservation. What distinguished the open area, where the tribe had
no regulatory power, was seemingly tied to how much non-Indian set-
tlement had destroyed the contiguity of the reservation. Much of In-
dian Country today has such a checkerboard configuration to which
Congress responded with the Indian Country statute. The Brendale
distinction, without any discernible standard, bodes poorly for future
cases. In the situation of the closed area, where the tribe obtained
32 508 U.S. 114, 123-28 (1993) (holding that a state does not have jurisdiction to tax tribal
members who live and work in Indian country absent explicit congressional direction to the
contrary).
s2 498 U.S. 505, 509-14 (1991) (holding under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity, a
state that has not asserted jurisdiction over Indian lands cannot tax goods sold to tribesmen on
land held in trust for a tribe).
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.5 (2001). In Atkinson, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for the majority, disposed of any reliance on the Indian Country statute because "we
do not deal here with a claim of statutorily conferred power. Section 1151 simply does not ad-
dress an Indian tribe's inherent or retained sovereignty over nonmembers or non-Indian fee
land." Id. Then the Court invoked Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) to establish that tribes
are not "full territorial sovereigns" with the power to enforce laws against all who come within
the sovereign's territory. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653.
331 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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zoning jurisdiction, the non-Indian property was surrounded by tribal
trust land, pristine and undeveloped. This virginal quality was de-
scribed as the Indian "essential character" of the land.3  The content
of Indian character is mysterious and could doom any efforts of the
tribe for economic development that would alter the land. Justice
Scalia in Atkinson stated that "it [is] plain that the judgment in Bren-
dale turned on both the closed nature of the non-Indian fee land and
the fact that its development would place the entire area 'in jeop-
ardy.', 3 3 Any standards for Indian "character" and "closed" land are
open to challenge. Why should they be invented by the Court when• • 3343• 336
cases like Williams,33 Sac and Fox, 3 and Potawatomie, and the Indian
country statute exist? Even if one accepts that these terms are func-
tionally needed, the standards are unlikely to achieve legal content
one can respect. The elusiveness of these ad hoc distinctions was evi-
dent in Atkinson where the non-Indian property surrounded by Na-
vajo trust land was placed in the state's jurisdiction.
5. Demand Ahistorical Specificity of Terms in Treaties and Statutes
The Court has implanted in Indian law a requirement that as-
sumes that treaty and statute drafters in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries were omniscient. Somehow they would know the
concerns and regulatory issues of future relationships with tribes and
the states yet unborn. Consequently, there is perverse interpretation
of treaty terms or of silence in treaties, e.g., the removal treaties used
to induce resistant tribes to remove to the Indian Territory in present
day Oklahoma. These treaties made promises to tribes that, if they
removed, no state would impose its laws or jurisdiction over the tribe
331or its members.
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation the Chickasaws in-
voked the treaty that promised "no Territory or State shall ever have a
332 Id. at 44, 464-65.
Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 658-59 ("Irrespective of the percentage of non-Indian fee land within
a reservation, Montana's second exception grants Indian tribes nothing 'beyond what is neces-
sary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations."'). The isolated non-
Indian property in Atkinson was within the Navajo Nation reservation where the tribe owns 96.3
percent of the land. Id. at 657 n.11.
&M Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
335 Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993).
&% Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
337 See generally Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970) (describing the removal
treaties with Cherokees and Choctaws, which included a patent to lands and the bed of the Ar-
kansas River); DEBO, supra note 253 (explaining that the Chickasaws held similar rights under
their removal treaties). The Supreme Court later provided an account of the Cherokee and
Choctaw treaties in Montana v. U.S., 450 U.S. 544, 555 n.5 (1981), to distinguish the Crow trea-
ties.
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right to pass laws for the government of the [Chickasaw] Nation of
Red People and their descendants. . . but the U.S. shall forever se-
cure said [Chickasaw] Nation from, and against, all [such]
laws. . ."" Despite the explicit terms of the Treaty of Dancing Rab-
bit Creek in 1830 that provided immunity from the state's regulation
for the tribe and its descendants, Justice Ginsberg overlooked the
preemptive power of the treaty. In the history of this period, the
Chickasaw Government and its members feared the states and their
uncontrolled, land-hungry citizens who repeatedly invaded their
tribal lands. 9
Forced to accept removal, the Chickasaws had a future perspective
about what they feared and had to negotiate around: state power in
any form. Justice Ginsberg stated it is not likely that the treaty's sig-
natories gave any thought to state authority to tax the income of
members. However, instead of understanding the context of the
treaty, part of the Court's especially developed canons of construc-
tion in Indian law, Justice Ginsberg applied general tax law.4' The
treaties of the Chickasaws and similar treaties still have force today in
relationships with the federal and state governments. The ahistorical
dismissal of the tribe's claim to a treaty right demonstrated the
Court's failure to appreciate the constitutional status of tribes as na-
tions who made treaties in which jurisdictional substance mattered.
Moreover, decisions such as these reflect poorly on the Court's un-
derstanding that tribal treaties are part of the supreme law of the
land.
6. Change Without Acknowledgement of the Burden of Proof
and Concepts Like Privity
From the pro-state presumptions in Oliphant, Montana and Strate,
that deny tribes jurisdiction over non-Indians in their person or over
their property, other unstated ideas have permeated Indian law. One
effect is a shift in the burden of proof. Montana introduced the two
exceptions that somehow became the Court's rule without an expla-
nation of what foundational principles would allow state jurisdiction.
A tribe can have civil jurisdiction over non-Indians present within a
tribe's jurisdictional territory if either non-Indians consent or the
&% 515 U.S. 450, 465 (1995) (citing the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, art.
IV, 7 Stat. 333-34).
&39 See DEBO, supra note 253.
mo Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. at 466-67 (suggesting signatories did not expect tribal members
to be present in state territory rather than on tribal land).
341 See Krakoff, supra note 17, at 124244 (stating thatJustice Ginsberg in Chickasaw used In-
dian law as "gap-filler" for the Court's preference to primarily use general law when Indian laws
should have applied).
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non-Indians' conduct on fee lands "threatens or has some direct ef-
fect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe." 42 The Montana exceptions collaterally created
an unstated shift of the evidence demanded from tribes to sustain the
claimed interest.
The in-effect shift of the burden of proof began in Montana:
"[N]othing in this case suggests that such non-Indian hunting and
fishing so threaten the Tribe's political or economic security as to jus-
tify tribal regulation. The complaint in the District Court did not al-
lege that non-Indian hunting and fishing on fee lands imperil the
subsistence or welfare of the Tribe. ' 3 Then in Brendale, the threat to
a tribal interest was ratcheted up in the plurality opinion: "The im-
pact must be demonstrablserious and must imperil" the four inter-
ests specified in Montana. "This standard will sufficiently protect
Indian tribes while at the same time avoiding undue interference
with state sovereignty and providing the certainty needed by property
owners."3 It is undue interference with the state's sovereignty that
guides, the reverse of the infringement test in Williams.
Recently in Atkinson, the Court cited Montana and specified that
"unless the drain of the nonmember's [non-Indian's] conduct upon
tribal services and resources is so severe that it actually 'imperil[s]'
the political integrity of the Indian tribe, there can be no assertion of
civil authority beyond tribal lands." These statements captured the
change in presumption that favors the state with the accompanying
shift in the burden of proof. Must the tribe show that members are
on the verge of death because of the non-Indian's adverse impact on
its health resources, for instance, and that the tribal government
faces administrative collapse unless it has the authority over the non-
Indian? What is clear is that the tribe must prove, at some demand-
ing level of evidence, the imperiling harm that it is experiencing or
will certainly experience.
This cumulative burden on the tribes is a reversal of the burden of
proof required in Williams, Central Machinery Company v. Arizona State
Tax Commission,3 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,4 McClana-
%" Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66. The Court has used the term "nonmember" inconsistently,
but the cases since Oliphant have focused on non-Indians. The Congressional correction of the
Duro decision has restored tribal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians.
343 Id. at 566.
44 Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
431 (1989) (plurality opinion of White,J.).
345It
M5Id.
36 Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 658 n.12 (2001) (citing Montana, 450 U.S.
at 566).
347 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
M8 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
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han, and New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe49 where the state had to
demonstrate its bona fide interest. In these cases the Court consid-
ered whether the evidence supported the state's proclaimed interest
and whether it was substantial enough to justify invading the tribe's
jurisdiction.
In Strate, a typical tort accident on a highway, the Court collater-
ally subverted long standing tort liability without acknowledging its
work. Sufficient minimum contacts analysis would allow any state,
within the U.S. or an international context, to apply its laws and ad-
judicate for a non-citizen defendant with the case's facts.35 0 In Strate
the plaintiff was a resident and domiciliary of the tribe's reservation
and Indian Country. She was a non-Indian widow whose husband
had been a member and her children were all members. 5 The de-
fendant was a non-Indian employee of a contractor performing serv-
ices under a contract with the tribe for a tribal construction project.
The Court described the parties as "strangers" whose lack of a re-
lationship with the Tribe affected jurisdiction. 52 Most auto accidents
involve strangers, which does not prevent non-Indian jurisdictions
from applying their own tort laws. It is a mystery why this stranger-
quality should matter in removing the accident from the tribe's regu-
latory and adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Court stated that the plain-
tiff widow was not in a contract with the defendant. Is this a sub-rosa
revival of an anachronistic notion of privity? Unfair denials of stand-
ing and causes of action, derived from outdated ideas of privity, were
removed from law in the U.S. some time ago. Anyone who is in-
jured in an auto accident arguably caused by the negligence of an-
other can sue for her injuries and losses. The law regime of vehicu-
lar-caused torts and liability arising from lawn mower accidents would
fall apart on outdated reasoning requiring a contract between the in-
jured party and the tort defendant. It is unimaginable that the Court
would apply such vacuous reasoning to states, municipalities, or
counties where individuals or citizens had the misfortune to suffer in-
juries from the acts of a stranger who is not a member or citizen of
the political entity where the accident occurred.
349 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
3W Cf Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding that due process depends
on the quality and nature of the party's activities in the state seeking to exercise jurisdiction;
systematic and continuous activity provide sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction).
351 See Krakoff, supra note 17, at 1256-62 (thoroughly analyzing this case).
352 Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997).
33 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 696-97 (1971) (describing the
decline of privity of contract); see also MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916);




C. The Need for and the Requisites for Inoculation
When rampant disease endangers the existence of a people or of
important resources, inoculation is an important counterforce. The
Supreme Court's Indian law cases create exigencies that mandate
immunization. At stake is the future of American Indian peoples as
well as the integrity of the federal jurisprudence in Indian law. The
Court itself has noted the current disorder that it labels incoherence.
In Atkinson, Justices Souter, Kennedy, and Thomas articulated that,
"If we are to see coherence in the various manifestations of the gen-
eral law of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians .. ."4 then a concerted
approach was necessary. However, they then treated Montana as the
source for doctrine, not the Court's own precedent cases and doc-
trines, such as infringement. Curing the destructive disorder or in-
coherence requires more than the easy arbitrary solution of making
Montana the judicial oracle.
Before inoculation can work as a preventive remedy, it is necessary
to delineate the destructive force at work. Acknowledging what
causes the harm, the incoherence and deviation from the constitu-
tional principles regarding the American Indian tribes, requires a re-
turn to the national foundations. The Court, as the primary cause
has circumvented the basic idea that tribes affected how the constitu-
tional framework was designed because they are distinct sovereigns.
This unique political status and relationship is designated in the text
of the nation's covenant, the Constitution. The first sovereigns
within the borders of the U.S., tribes have never ceased to exist.
The larger issue at stake in nearly all Indian law cases is the relationship
of tribes to the United States-a matter rooted in centuries-old policy
created as part of the nation's constitutional framework. The Justices,
however, do not appear to comprehend Indian law cases as implicating a
set of ancient policies that define the nation's relationships with tribes. '
Treating American Indian nations as an inconvenient racial or ethnic
minority disregards the historical and legal relationship between the
tribes and the federal government constructed since the first Euro-
pean contact. As the twenty-first century starts, the Court's cases defy
the cumulative policy from Congress and the Court's own jurispru-
dence that conserved the unique relationship, albeit unevenly at
times, by excluding state power.
The foundational relationship continues today in the operative
treaties, statutes, and collaborative intergovernmental agreements,
and it should guide Indian law decisions. This enduring relationship
conforms to the constitutional principles invoked in Worcester and
Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (SouterJ., concurring).
Getches, supra note 17, at 329.
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consequent cases and statutes. When Justices ignore the founda-
tional principle, they subject tribes to a three-part trap created by the
156Court's decisional trends, as noted by Getches. First, the justices
have arbitrarily expanded state power over tribes and their territory,
disregarding congressional authority and the policy of self-
determination. Second, the Court has treated Indians as another ra-
cial minority, "racializing" the political status as it did in Oliphant. Ti-
tle 25 of the U.S. Code is devoted solely to Indians, the only discrete
group with an exclusive area in federal law, so the Court's demands
for race-neutrality in law are unlikely to be met. Finally, the Court
has denied constitutional protection to minority rights because they
are outside of mainstream values, as occurred in Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith M1 for the use of peyote
(a hallucinogenic drug) in the Native American Church. As long as
the Court follows this three-part trap and defies the constitutional
foundations, it produces Indian law without the substance and doc-
trinal authority due from Constitutional law.
Inoculation requires that the Court "rediscover Indian law,, 5 1 the
sui generis tradition that began before the nation and guided the ul-
timate design of this constitutional democracy. Rediscovery with sub-
stantive knowledge will guide the Court to the constitutional founda-
tion setting the relationships with the tribes outside of states' power.
The framers' essential idea to construct only tribal-federal relation-
ships should inform decision-making by the Court. Judicial conduct
in compliance with constitutional principles requires respecting that
Congress is the enumerated political branch and it develops how the
relationship will be pursued. Judicial restraint, a long respected
method of the federal courts, is warranted for the future of American
Indian peoples and the Court's own jurisprudence. The integrity of
both the Indian nations and the Court deserve this conscientious
commitment.
VII. CONCLUSION: How CAN INDIAN LAW FIT
THE FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES
Besides inoculation, how can one prevent the spread of a destruc-
tive infective force? Certainly, quarantine strategies are a common
topic in the Indian law world. Advice to stay away from the Supreme
Court, if a tribe is able, 'Makes sense. Focusing on Congress and the
W See id. at 316-27 (describing the three trends that explain the outcomes in Indian law deci-
sions).
37 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
3M Getches, supra note 17, at 352-60 (describing a discovery process that takes into account
the congressional policies and other elements necessary for appreciation of Indian law, a field
as specialized as international law).
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Executive fit into this strategy. Increasing tribal negotiations and
agreements with states and working with state legislatures is another
approach to prevent damage. In past outbreaks of microbial disease,
there were fatalities and survivors. The latter often endured lifelong
disabilities. The tribes have proved that they are surviving and con-
tinuing cultural governments despite historical wrongs such as the
United States' violations of treaties. The task now is to prevent fur-
ther disabling as tribal sovereigns strive to function as twenty-first cen-
tury governments who responsibly serve all who reside within the
borders of their territory.
Containing deviational law first requires eliminating ignorance
about how tribes fit in with constitutional principles, including the
framers' specific solution to make relations with tribes a federal re-
sponsibility. The education needed here is for people beyond the
Supreme Court, who has a special duty to protect and enforce foun-
dational principles. In addition, the general public must be educated
to understand that American Indian nations were the first sovereigns
within the present day United States. They had a significant role in
the formation of the republic and were structured into the constitu-
tional framework that remains unchanged. The tribes' willingness to
make treaties assured the survival of the union. Tribal lands gener-
ated the income to pay the national debt for the Revolutionary War
and enabled the growth of the United States.359 Indigenous people
have a special relationship to their lands; it is not real estate, but their
source of culture and identity. The sacrifice of indigenous lands
would be hard for any other group to match as a contribution to the
building of the new republic in the eighteenth century.
The tribal nations have not disappeared and do not intend to do
so. Rather, they aim, as do other responsible governments, to pro-
vide for the needs of members and residents of their territory, while
conserving the cultural framework that has long distinguished in-
digenous peoples. Appreciation and respect for different cultures is
the continuing test of whether the United States can live in accord
with its proclaimed commitment to fairly and justly treat all members
of the national community. Whether acceptance can be made real,
in everyday life, is particularly tested by American Indians who form a
unique sovereign with the nation's borders.
A second ingredient for a better future is education on daily life
in Indian Country and the practical relationships that frequently exist
between tribes and their governmental neighbors. Again, people be-
yond the Court must realize that tribes and local governments are not
M9 JOHNSON, supra note 180, at 211-15 (describing the war debt of $27 million that escalated
to almost $54 million because states refused to pay the debt, proliferation and decline in value
of paper money, inflation, and citizens' resistance to taxes and tariffs to raise revenue).
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always adversaries with irreconcilable goals. In a time of limited pub-
lic funds, Indian and non-Indian governments have entered a massive
number of agreements that meet the common needs of health, safety,
welfare, and an enhanced quality of life. In the wake of the Court's
recent decisions, tribes will increase their efforts to cooperate, rather
than fight, with their neighboring governments. Because of mar-
riages, personal relations, and business ventures, Indian and non-
Indian people cross jurisdictional boundaries in their ordinary activi-
ties.
Certainly, there is animus in some situations, but that is not uni-
versal in contemporary life. Financially stressed governments,
pressed to provide services, do not enter collaborative partnerships
because of animus towards tribal governments, but out of mutual re-
sponsibility. Compacts and agreements insure that someone can re-
spond to the injured on the highway, the neglected child at risk, and
the fires that require immediate and sometimes massive response.
Cross-deputizing law enforcement officers and prosecutors will in-
crease the safety for everyone in a geographical community com-
prised of more than one jurisdiction. Non-tribal governments also
cooperate so that tribal enterprises thrive and create jobs for both
Indians and non-Indians. There are situations where status as a
member of a federally recognized Indian tribe matters for the re-
tained treaty and law-based rights. However, much of the life in In-
dian Country does not require combat in the hard-set lines of the ju-
risdictional warfare in the Court opinions. The Court should enable
cooperative relationships, not impair them.
A guide from the cultural framework of tribal people can be help-
ful for those working on making Indian law responsive to the founda-
tional principles arising from the relationships with American Indian
nations in the formation of this constitutional nation. In the creation
story of the Hopi and others, humans emerged from the earth, hav-
ing failed in the previous world to behave in accord with ethical prin-
ciples.) The people faced the daunting task of learning to survive in
a new world where their humanity would be tested. Spider Grand-
mother provided guidance in two rules: do not hurt each other, and
try to understand things. These rules fit the twenty-first century
struggle to make Indian law embody the highest ethical standards of
constitutional fairness andjustice. In this critical endeavor, the Court
should not just respond to bona fide demands, rather it should lead.
Numerous indigenous cultures in the United States have a Spider Grandmother or Spider
Woman, a creator of thought who weaves the fabric of life. See PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED
HOOP: REDISCOVERING THE FEMININE IN AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITIONS 11-29 (1986); see also
SPIDER WOMAN'S GRANDDAUGHTERS: TRADITIONAL TALES AND CONTEMPORARY WRITINGS BY
NATIVE AMERICAN WOMEN (Paula Gunn Allen ed., 1989).
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